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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND

Introduction

One of the current issues in American politics today is what the
military spending level should be.

This controversy over the size of

the defense budget has arisen largely because of the frustration over
the Vietnam war.

Many people have called for a change in "priorities"

to meet pressing domestic problems by cutting down on defense expen
ditures.

One key question in this debate over defense policy and

spending is what role should the military play in American society
today?
Civilian control of the military is one of the theories of
democratic government.

In the United States, the civilian govern

mental office holders theoretically control the military officers, who
must obey their civilian superiors.

This principle has been established

in the Constitution of the United States.

The colonists, having suf

fered under British rule, were determined to prevent the creation of
a strong military establishment.

To that end, civilian control powers

were provided for in the Constitution, being divided between the
executive and legislative branches.

Under Article II, Section 2, the

President was made, ". . . Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States,. . .

Congress, under Article I, Section 8, was

% . S., Constitution, Art. II, sec. 2, clause 1.
1
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given the following powers:
(11) To declare War, . . .;
(12) To raise and support Annies, but no appropriation of
Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
(13) To provide and maintain a Navy;
(14) To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces;
(18) To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Power, . . .^
The authorization and appropriation powers were considered to be very
important, for they allowed Congress to set " . . .

ceilings to prevent

a tyrannical executive from maintaining military forces without the
consent of the people."

2

American military officers themselves have recognized this civilian
control principle.

This was clearly indicated in the testimony of

General Omar N. Bradley during the Army-MacArthur hearings of May, 1951.
General Bradley, who at the time was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, said that one of the reasons why General Douglas MacArthur was
relieved of his command in Korea was,
...that - 'they, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have felt and
feel now that the military must be controlled by civilian
authority in this country.' They have always adhered to
this principle and they felt that General MacArthur's
actions were continuing to jeopardize the civilian control
over the military authorities.^

% . S., Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8, clauses 11-14, 18.
2

Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Planning and the Political
Process," Foreign Affairs, XXXVIII (January, 1960), 288.
3
U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee
on Foreign Relations, The Military Situation in the Far East and the
Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
from His Assignments in That Area, Hearings, before a joint committee
of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951, Part II, pp. 878-79.
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The Scope of This Study

The civilian control theory can be analyzed in many ways.

The

interaction between the President of the United States and the Defense
Department could be examined.

Another area of possible inquiry could

be the relationship between the Pentagon and the State Department in
the field of foreign policy.

These are just two of the topics that

could be explored in testing the civilian control theory.

This study

is limited to Congress and its relationship with the military.
More specifically, this paper will concentrate on studying legis
lative behavior rather than evaluating the legislative role in national
security affairs (A brief history of Congress' role in military matters
will be presented later in this chapter).

The general purpose of this

study is not to determine what should be (role) but rather what is
(behavior).

By studying particular roll call votes, the writer hopes

to indicate how congressmen reacted to certain decisional stiuations.
By investigating the voting patterns on roll call votes, it can be
determined how congressmen reacted to various proposals.
This is a somewhat limited approach, since roll calls represent
only a part of the legislative decision-making process.

This paper will

not include a study of informal activities, such as party caucuses,
committee hearings, meetings of legislative leaders, and meetings bet
ween the administration and congressional officials, where controversial
and important issues may be settled.

However, roll call data are readily

available and represent the public stands of congressmen on various
political issues.
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The Growth of the Military

The military in pre-World War II America: A review of the
historical role of the military in American society must be con
sidered.

Today the United States has more men under arms than do

either the Soviet Union or China,^ giving it the largest armed forces
in the world.

But until recently this has generally not been the case.

In the past, the American people had always feared a large standing
army.

President George Washington expressed this view in his Farewell

Address on September 17, 1796, warning that, ". . . overgrown military
establishments. . . are to be regarded as particularly hostile to
republican liberty."

2

Because of such factors as geography and weak

neighboring countries, the United States maintained a large Army and
Navy only during wartime.

When the wars were over, expenditures for

and the size of the armed forces were quickly reduced.
This trend continued up until World War II.

Thus, ". . . the

regular military establishment was small and enjoyed even less prestige
or influence."

3

Pre-World War II officers were rarely involved in

national politics.

The nation's arms were produced either by government

arsenals or by industry, which temporarily converted from peacetime
to wartime production.
ed to drastic cuts.

During peacetime, defense spending was subject

"The highest peacetime military budgets of the

^Richard J. Barnet, The Economy of Death (New York:
1969), p. 37.

Atheneum,

2

Burton Ira Kaufman, ed., Washington's Farewell Address: The View
from the 20th Century (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1969), p. 20.
3
James A. Donovan, Militarism, U. S. A., with a Foreword by David
M. Shoup (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), p. 3.
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past ranged from $600 to $900 million a year under Franklin Roosevelt —
. . ."^

Peacetime military budgets before 1939 equalled to about 1

percent of the nation's gross national product each year.

2

The growth of the military during World War II: The coming of
World War II forced the United States out of its isolationist mood of
the 1930's.

The armed forces (on active duty), which numbered 320,100
3
men (Army, Navy, and Marines) in 1939, grew to 12,123,455 (Army,
8,267,958; Navy, 3,380,817; and Marines, 474,680) by 1945.

4

"Federal

defense spending soared from $9 billion in 1940 to $95 billion in 1944;
in mid-1943 the United States was spending at the rate of almost $8
billion a m o n t h . I n 1958 constant dollars this means that a defense bud
g
get of $95 billion in 1944 would be equivalent to $176.5 billion in 1972.

^Sidney Lens, The Military-Industrial Complex (Philadelphia:
Pilgrim Press, 1970; Kansas City, Mo.: National Catholic Reporter,
1970), p. 11.
o

Bruce M[artin] Russett, What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of
National Defense (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970),
p. 2. (Hereinafter referred to as Price.)
3
Donovan, Militarism, U. S. A ., p. 3.
4Ibid., p. 239.
^Ibid., p . 10.
^This figure was obtained by using the data given in U. S., Depart
ment of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, Survey of Current Busi
ness: 1969 Business Statistics, supplement (17th biennial ed.; Washing
ton, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 2, 4. Although the
amount of money listed under the category "National Defense" for 1944
is only $87.4 billion, the equations 89.0/165.4 - 87.4/x (89.0 billion
= the total federal budget in 1944, $165.4 billion - the total federal
budget in 1944 in constant dollars, and x = $162.4 billion) and 87.4/
162.4 = 95/x were used to determine the amount in constant dollars (1958)
for a $95 billion defense budget (The 1969 edition of the SCB contains
the 1944 data). The government uses 1958 as the base year for all con
stant dollar figures.
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The Cold War: After the war, the United States reverted to the
prewar tradition by reducing its armed forces, and it demobilized very
quickly.

"By the summer of 1946 the Army had been reduced to 1.5

million men and the Navy to 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 . Defense spending was also
reduced accordingly, with the defense budget reaching a low of $11.1
billion for fiscal year (FY) 1948.

2

Yet at the same time the United

States chose to play an active role in world affairs.
Doctrine and Kennan s containment policy
spread of Communism.

3

The Truman

were designed to prevent the

The United States began to make military alliances

during the late 1940's, signing the Rio Treaty of 1947 (Latin America)
and the NATO Treaty of 1949 (Western Europe).

Because of this and the

Air Force's demands for more planes, defense expenditures rose to over
$15 billion ($12.95 billion in appropriations) by FY 1950.

4

More

importantly, the armed forces no longer remained isolated from the rest
of society.

Many prominent military individuals moved into the ranks

of government and industry and began making important decisions.
example, in 1948 there were, " . . .

For

some one hundred and fifty pro

fessional military men in key policy-determining posts in civilian

^Donovan, Militarism, U. S. A ., p. 11.
n

"The 'Military Lobby' — Its Impact on Congress, Nation," Con
gressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XIX (March 24, 1961), 463.
O

For a full explanation of George F. Kennan's containment policy
see his book entitled American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 119, 126.
4
Edward A. Kolodziez, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 19451963 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 106.
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government."

One good illustration of this was General George Cat

lett Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army during World War II, who
served as Secretary of State from 1947 to 1949 and as Secretary of De
fense from 1950 to 1951.
Defense expenditures soared during the Korean War.

In appropria

tions alone, Congress approved $56.9 billion in FY 1952, compared with
2

$13.3 billion in FY 1951.

U. S. armed forces were built up again

after a period of neglect.

This increase helped the U. S. meet its

various defense commitments.

During this era, over 13 percent of the

nation s gross national product was being spent for national defense.

3

After the Korean War, the arms race between the U. S. and Russia
continued.

Adopting a defensive strategy of massive retaliation, the

Eisenhower Administration sought to provide U. S. armed forces with the
most advanced weapons possible.

Efforts were always made to keep

ahead in the arms race:
In the early ’50s there was the 'bomber gap.' Fearful that
the Russians would produce fleets of intercontinental bombers
that would leave the U. S. exposed to attack, the nation
began shelling out billions for new bomber series and an
extensive air defense system. The Russians never fulfilled
their bomber potential.

•'■Richard Carlton Snyder and H. Hubert Wilson, eds., Roots of
Political Behavior: Introduction to Government and Politics (New
York: American Book Company, 1949), p. 557.
o
"Military Critics Win Some Battles on Defense Costs," Congres
sional Quarterly Weekly Report, XXVII (December 19, 1969), 2657.
^Samuel P. Huntington, "The Defense Establishment: Vested
Interests and the Public Interest," in The Military-Industrial Com
plex and U. S. Foreign Policy, ed. by Omer L. Carey (Pullman, Wash.:
Washington State University Press, 1969), p. 5.
^"The Military:
1969, pp. 23-24.

Servant or Master of Policy?"

Time, April 11,
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A permanent arms industry: This increasing emphasis on technology led
to a new phenomenon in American history —

a permanent arms industry.

The Department of Defense (DOD), seeking new advances in aircraft,
missiles, and electronics, looked to private industry to do most of the
research and production.

Aerospace companies like General Dynamics and

Lockheed began to grow, depending almost entirely on the DOD for
research funds and as the main buyer of most of their products.
military weapons are also sold to foreign countries.)

(Many

A close rela

tionship developed between the DOD and the defense contractors to
work on defense problems.

Many former high ranking officers were being

hired by firms doing defense work, seeking to use their military
expertise.
The rise in defense spending: Despite President Dwight D.
Eisenhower's efforts, the defense budget gradually increased to more
than $40 billion by FY 1960,^ almost half of the federal budget.

With

an increase in American defense commitments during the 1950's, more
military bases were established abroad as well as at home.

Further

more, many areas of the country were becoming economically dependent
upon local defense installations and/or industries.
viewed with alarm by some people.

This situation was

C. Wright Mills saw the country

being ruled by an elite composed of, ". . . those who control the major
means of production and those who control the newly enlarged means of
violence; . . .

■^"Defense Requirements Face Severe Budget Strains," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report, XVIII (January 1, 1960), 11.
2
C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York:
Press, Inc., 1956), p. 276.

Oxford University

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9
In his Farewell Address to the nation on January 17, 1961,
President Eisenhower put the issue into perspective with his warning
about the "military-industrial complex:"
In the councils of government we must guard against the
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential
for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will
persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger
our liberties or democratic processes.
During the I960 Presidential campaign, the issue of a "missile gap"
was raised by the Democrats.

When he assumed office, President John F.

Kennedy increased defense spending, saying in his Inaugural Address
that, " . . .

only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be

certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed."

He also em

barked the country on a larger role in space in a special message to
Congress on May 25, 1961:
. . ., I believe that this nation should commit itself to
achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing
a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth. . .
Let it be clear that I am asking the Congress and the
country to accept a firm commitment to a new course of action a course which will last for many years and carry very heavy
costs - . . .
This decision demands a major national commitment of
scientific and technical manpower, material, and facilities,
and the possibility of their diversion from other important
activities where they are already thinly spread.^

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, "President Eisenhower's Fare
well to the Nation," The Department of State Bulletin, XLIV (February
6, 1961), 180-81. (Hereinafter referred to as "Farewell to Nation.")
2
President John F. Kennedy, "The Inaugural Address of President
Kennedy," The Department of State Bulletin, XLIV (February 6, 1961), 176.
^President John F. Kennedy, "The American Freedom Doctrine,"
Vital Speeches & Documents of the Day (New Delhi, India) , I (June 15,
1961), 399.
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Therefore, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
budget (defense-related spending) was also increased.

During the early

1960's, defense spending rose to over $50 billion a year.

Much of this

additional money went to the Army to strengthen its conventional forces
for "limited wars."

Many people approved of these larger military

budgets because of the Cold War and also partially because of the econo
mic benefits of military expenditures.
The United States' involvement in Vietnam raised defense spending
to near the $80 billion mark.

The defense budget for fiscal year 1969

was $79,788,000,000, 42.9 percent of the Federal budget.^

The strength

of the armed forces (on active duty only) had increased from 2,683,752
men and women in 1965

3

to 3,477,500 in 1969.

4

Defense spending

continued to play vital role in the nation's economy.

On December

13, 1967, Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas stated:
As the largest producer of goods and services in the United
States, the industries and businesses that fill military
orders will in the coming fiscal year pour some $45 billion
into over 5,000 cities and towns where over 8 million
Americans, counting members of the Armed Forces, comprising
approximately 10 percent of the labor force, will earn their
living from defense spending.^

Clark R. Mollenhoff, The Pentagon: Politics, Profits, and
Plunder (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1967), p. 368. (Hereinafter
referred to as Pentagon.)
2

Donovan, Militarism, U. S. A ., p. 45.

3Ibid., p. 239.
4
Ibid., p. 52.
3U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator J. William Fulbright speaking
on "The War and Its Effects - II," 90th Cong., 1st sess., December 13,
1967, Congressional Record, CXIII, 36, 181.
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In 1969, the number of people employed by the DOD and related agencies
was 6.3 million (3.4 million military and 2.9 million civilian
personnel).^
The growth of the Pentagon: The Pentagon has grown into an
enormous institution.

Pentagon officials have been given almost un

limited funds to spend for national defense.

"Since the end of World

War II we have spent more than one trillion dollars, or two-thirds of
the total expenditures of our federal government, on armaments and armed
forces."

2

Since the Korean War, between 7.3 and 11.3 percent of our
3
gross national product has gone for national defense.
The Pentagon
has now become, " . . .

the largest single consumer organization" in the

4
U. S.

s
The DOD has more than 6,000 military bases within the U. S.,

help make it, ". . . the nation's largest landlord."^

to

Furthermore, to

honor the United States' defense commitments to more than forty-two

■'"Donovan, Militarism, U. S. A ., p. 52.
2

Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden, eds., American Militarism
1970: A Dialogue on the Distortion of Our National Priorities and the
Need to Reassert Control over the Defense Establishment (New York:
Viking Press, inc., 1969), p. 11.
3
Russett, Price, p. 2.
4
Donovan, Militarism, U. S. A ., p. 44.
^U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Stephen Young speaking on
"That Powerful Military-Industrial Complex," 91st Cong., 1st sess.,
March 24, 1969, Congressional Record, CXV, 7177. (Hereinafter referred
to as "Powerful Military-Industrial Complex.")
6

William Proxmire, Report from Wasteland: America s MilitaryIndustrial Complex, with a Foreword by Paul H. Douglas (New York:
Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 12. (Hereinafter referred to as
Wasteland.)
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nations all over the world,

the Defense Department has stationed over

1,200,000 U. S. men overseas at 2,270 locations in 119 countries (as of
August, 1969).

2

Private industry and defense work: During the 1960's, doing
defense work became a more desirable and profitable enterprise.

"The

industries and businesses which fill military orders have become the
largest single producer of goods and services in the United States. . ."
Besides industries and businesses, others were avidly seeking part of
this defense work, such as labor unions, universities, research organi
zations, communities, and politicians.

In industry, "Some 22,000

prime contractors and 100,000 subcontractors enjoy the defense business
that is generated in different military programs."^

The method of

distributing these contracts has tended to be a very selective process:
In the period from 1951 through fiscal 1965, the
Pentagon let contracts worth more than $357 billion.
Only 13.7 percent of those contracts, covering $49
billion, were awarded througji formally advertised bid
ding procurement procedures.
Nor has this situation improved recently:
Negotiated contracts, to a considerable extent with solesource suppliers, have come to replace true competition.
In fiscal year 1969 formally advertised competitive
contract awards declined to 11 percent. The remainder

"'■"The New Pressures to Trim U. S. Defenses," U. S. News and
World Report, July 21, 1969, pp. 39-40.
2
Donovan, Militarism, U. S. A ., p. 2.
^Ibid., p. 44.
4
Jack Raymond, Growing Threat of Our Military-Industrial Com
plex," Harvard Business Review, XLVI (May-June, 1968), 57.
^Mollenhoff, Pentagon, p. 16.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

were negotiated, mostly with sole-source contractors.
Also,

1

. . some $13 billion worth of government-owned property is

used by defense contractors."

2

Many of the one hundred largest defense contractors have become
very dependent on these DOD awards.

These 100 companies, which

received 67.4 percent of all prime military contracts awarded in 1968,
generate much pressure for new weapons systems.

3

Many of them, like

the aerospace companies, three-fourths of whose sales are to the
government,

4

have developed close ties with the DOD and NASA.

A

virtual alliance has been formed between the DOD and industry, with
each seeking more defense money from the government.
The situation in 1972; Although there have been some cuts in the
defense budget, today the budget is still over $70 billion.

According

to Getler, the Defense Department also has some elaborate new weapons
systems planned for the future.

So the defense allocation decisions

of the government will probably continue to affect the entire nation,
as former President Eisenhower indicated in his Farewell Address:

"The

Hi. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Military Budget and
National Economic Priorities, Report of the Subcommittee on Economy in
Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Joint Committee Print, 91st
Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969),

p. 4.
2

Ralph E . Lapp, Arms beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Techno
logy (New York: Cowles Book Company, Inc., 1970), p. 157.
3
Barnet, The Economy of Death, p. 101.
4
Ralph E. Lapp, "Cutting the Defense Budget: Can the Next
President Do It?" New Republic, September 28, 1968, p. 26.
^Michael Getler, '"On the Other Hand, Mr. President,"' Armed
Forces Management, XVI (April, 1970), 25.
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total influence— economic, political, even spiritual— is felt in every
city, every statehouse, every office of the Federal Government.111 The
suggestion has even been made that without large amounts of defense
spending, the nation might go into an economic depression.

2

The Role of Congress in Military Affairs

Congressional powers: Under the Constitution Congress shares part
of the responsibility of checking on the military.

Congress has

various methods which it can use to review and control military requests.
"The two chief means of congressional control of the military are the
power of the purse and the power of investigation."
considered to be the stronger method,

4

3

The former,

was used very extensively by

Congress before World War II to control the military:
Prior to 1940 the executive was generally more favorably
inclined toward a larger military establishment than was
Congress. Congress had less immediate contact with
foreign dangers and was under greater popular pressure to
cut spending.

Eisenhower, "Farewell to Nation," p. 180.
2

For example, see Report from Iron Mountain on the Possibility
and Desirability of Peace, with an Introduction by Leonard C. Lewin
(New York: Dial Press, Inc., 1967), pp. 35-38, 58.
3
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory
and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 324. (Hereinafter referred
to as Soldier and State.)
4
Bruce Martin Russett, "What the Hawks Look To," America, CXXIII
(July 11, 1970), 13.
^Huntington, Soldier and State, p. 180.
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For example, up to four or five days were sometimes spent in the House
debating over the low Army budgets of the 1930's."*'

Only during wartime

did Congress temporarily give up its close control over military expenses.
Congress' investigating power can also be an effective instrument
in controlling and reviewing defense activities.
strengthened under the following statute:

This power was further

"After first informing the

Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make
such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense
as he may consider appropriate."

2

Thus Congress can obtain information

from other sources besides the administration.
These two congressional powers for checking the military have
generally been wielded by the House and Senate Armed Services and
Appropriations committees.

These four committees, " . . .

among the most

3

powerful in the House and Senate,"

are mainly responsible for military

affairs and receive the Defense Department's proposals and requests
for funds.

These committees help determine what the military policy and

budget will be for each fiscal year.
The defense lobby: The need for advanced weapons research and pro
duction, especially after the Korean War, led to the formation of a new
lobbying group.

The Pentagon and the industrial contractors, seeking

the production of new weapons and more military business respectively,
began to exert pressure upon Congress for more and more defense spending.

''"Huntington, Soldier and State, pp. 324-25.
^Act of September 7, 1962, U. S. Code, Vol. II, sec. 141(e) (1970).
3

Proxmire, Wasteland, p. 98.
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The Pentagon created its own legislative lobby to help influence
congressmen.

According to Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, "At

the end of World War II, . . ., the military had only five legislative
agents on Capitol Hill."

In a recent survey Senator Proxmire found

that, "The Pentagon spends a minimum of $4 "million a year on its 339
congressional liaison specialists, the polite term for lobbyists.

This

is more than one for every two of the 535 members of the House and
Senate."

2

Industries, through campaign contributions and their own

lobbying efforts, also generate more pressure on congressmen.
Congressmen have been especially subjected to pressure in a very
sensitive area— the distribution of defense contracts and installations.
For many communities, defense spending has become an important source
of income.

On March 24, 1969, Senator Stephen Young of Ohio said, "In

many areas of the Nation a situation has been created whereby the local
economy would virtually collapse if major military or so-called defense
procurement were to end."

3

Major defense plants and/or military

installations are now located in all fifty states and in 363 of the
country's 435 congressional districts.^

How much this situation has

affected congressmen's voting on defense programs will be one topic
explored in this paper.

^Julius Duscha, Arms, Money, and Politics (New York:
Washburn, Inc., 1965), p. 50.

Ives

2

Proxmire, Wasteland, p. 109.
3
Young, "Powerful Military-Industrial Complex," p. 7178.
4
William McGaffin and Erwin Knoll, Scandal in the Pentagon: A
Challenge to Democracy, Fawcett Gold Medal Book (Greenwich, Conn.:
Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1969), p. 96.
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Previous Studies

Until very recently social scientists have done little research
on the relationship between Congress and the military.

The articles

and books which have been written usually have offered just speculation
and hypotheses which have neither been backed up nor tested by statisti
cal data.

But recently, four studies, in which particular roll call

votes were analyzed, have sought to fill this void by trying to determine
how much political influence the Pentagon has had on Congress.
Mitchell's dissertation: The first study was a Doctoral disserta
tion written by Joyce Mitchell.

She analyzed the House and Senate roll

call votes of the 85th (1957-58) and 87th (1961-62) Congresses which
fell into one of these four general categories:

(1) magnitude of

defense at home, (2) magnitude of defense abroad, (3) scope of defense
powers at home, and (4) scope of defense powers abroad.

She attempted

to test major theories of legislative behavior on national security
issues by examining legislators' votes on relevent roll calls.

She

scored every legislator according to, ". . . the percentage of times
that he voted pro-defense [for increases and against decreases in the
four areas mentioned above], of the total number of times he cast a vote
on national security issues."'*’
Some of her findings with respect to the House of Representatives
are very interesting.

She found that the Democrats tended to be more

■*\Joyce Coward Mitchell, "Congress and National Security: An
Exploration of Legislative Decision-Making" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta
tion, University of California, Berkeley, 1964), p. 234. (Hereinafter
referred to as "Legislative Decision-Making.")
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pro-defense than the Republicans, especially when a Democrat was presi
dent.

She attributed this result to partially reflecting traditional

party ideologies:
The Democrats have repeatedly favored increased defense
spending and the expansion of the government’s role in
defense-related scientific exploration, while the Repub
licans reveal a suspicion of governmental expansion,
prefer economy to expenditure, and private to governmental
enterprise.
Thus partisanship was found to be a very decisive factor in the House:
As in so many other policy areas, the political party
is the predominant means by which aggregate positions
are formed on national security policy, and this pre
dominance of the party factor has increased from the
earlier to the later period under study.
With regards to the defense-related committees of the House, their
members were only slightly more favorable towards national security
legislation than were all House members, despite the fact that more and
more of these committee members were tending to be recruited with
special defense interests, such as coming from districts receiving
more defense funds.

Thus the voting patterns of committee members on

defense measures, " . . .

strongly resembled the partisan differences
3

of the general legislative membership."

Even in such committees as

Armed Services and Appropriations, which most directly handle domestic
military programs, there was no general consensus among committee mem
bers on defense issues, but rather there was polarization and some
strong opposition to defense enlargement.

"'"Mitchell, "Legislative Decision-Making," p. 449.
2

Ibid■, p. 448.

^Ibid., p. 454.
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Mitchell further determined that the defense interests of consti
tuencies (local military bases and defense contract expenditures) was
only slightly correlated with legislative voting on national security
measures.

Her calculations showed that there was, ”. . . very little

indication that constituency benefit is associated with legislators’
overall pro-defense positions."^

She concluded:

"If there is a

'military-industrial complex,' it has failed in this regard, and what
ever

the benefits gained for particular constituencies, there has been

no resultant general ideological support of increased defense measures."
In contrast, she found that regionalism was more closely correlated with
voting patterns.
Bozik's dissertation: The most thorough and detailed study of
congressional behavior on military measures was a Doctoral dissertation
done by Edward Bozik.

Bozik analyzed the voting patterns of both

House and Senate members on military legislation from 1951 through
1966.

He only investigated roll call votes on bills which fell into

one of four categories:

" . . . military construction authorizations,

y/
military construction appropriations,
authorizations for military
procurement, research, test, development and evaluation, and appropriations for the operating budget for the Department of Defense."

3

^Mitchell, "Legislative Decision-Making," p. 394.
^Ibid., p. 455.
3
Edward Eugene Bozik, "National Defense and Congressional Be
havior: Congressional Action on Authorizing and Appropriating
Legislation for Military Budgets and Military Construction, 1951-1966"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington,
D. C., 1968), p. 292. (Hereinafter referred to as "Congressional
Action.")
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Bozik used two different methods in analyzing congressional voting
behavior.

First, he used categorically defined issues and groups as

his independent variables, determining whether they were related to the
dependent variable, voting outcome.

These independent variables were

type of issue, political party, and geographic section.

These results

were then compared with those found using the second method, a Guttman
scale analysis of all contested roll calls.
data were used.

In both methods the same

He did this to determine, " . . .

the degree of conformity

between the investigator’s categoric perceptions [the variables] and
those of the legislators as evidenced by the scale analysis.""*'
results from both methods turned out to be very similar.

The

He further

analyzed his data to see whether military committee membership or the
patterns of defense allocations were related to the voting behavior of
the legislators.
Some of Bozik's findings are very interesting.
tary legislation was not a very controversial issue.

He found that mili
When controversy

did arise, however, he found that party affiliation was more closely
correlated with defense voting behavior than either geographic
section or military committee membership:

". . ., the most reliable

predictor of a representative [sic] voting behavior will be his party
affiliation."

2

Also, Democrats tended to be more pro-defense than

Republicans no matter which party controlled either the executive or the
legislative branch.

Using state and sectional data, he further concluded

^Bozik, "Congressional Action," p. 18.
2Ibid., p. 70.
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that there was no significant correlation between defense spending with
in a constituency and the voting behavior of the legislators.
Cobb1s findings: The third study dealt

with the House of

Representatives, 89th Congress, 1st session only (1965).

It was con

ducted by Stephen A. Cobb, a member of the Department of Sociology and
Anthropology at Vanderbilt University.

He sought to find a correlation

between defense spending and voting on foreign policy issues by House
members.

He set up his study in this manner because he had found that

almost all of the representatives had voted for the defense appropria
tions bills during that session.

For his independent variable, he gave

each congressman from the same state the same state-wide "defense in
volvement" and "defense dependency" scores calculated for his respective
state, using the total amount of defense spending and defense-generated
employment in that state.'''

He set up a "Jingoism Scale" (Guttman

scaling) to measure his dependent variable (voting on foreign policy
measures), wanting to rank the representatives according to their
"hawkishness."

The hypothesis was that the more defense money spent

in a congressional district, the more belligerent a foreign policy
attitude its representative would take.
hypothesis was refuted.

After doing many tests, this

Cobb explained this finding by saying that

logrolling had played a vital role in helping to get defense spending
measures passed.
Cobb also used party and region as independent variables in a

''"Stephen A. Cobb, "Defense Spending and Foreign Policy in the
House of Representatives," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIII
(September, 1969), 362-63. (Hereinafter referred to as "Defense
Spending and Foreign Policy.")
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multiple regression analysis and found:
. . . that Congressmen's jingoistic voting can be explained
in appreciable measure by their party affiliation and the
region they represent. We interpret these variables, 'party'
and 'region,' to-^be largely symbolic of stable, ideological
predispositions.
Republican and Southern representatives tended to be the most
"jingoistic" of all.

Cobb further found that party was the most im

portant influence on voting behavior according to his data.
Professor Russett's study: The
behavior on military matters was

most recent studyof congressional

the one done by Bruce Russett, a Yale

University political science professor.

The subjects of his research

were the U. S. Senators of the 87th (1961-62) and 90th (1967-68) Con
gresses.

Like Cobb, Russett used Guttman scaling procedures when

studying various roll calls.

Both studies differed in many respects.

Russett's lists of various defense and foreign policy roll call votes
for his scales contained a wider spectrum of issues than did Cobb's
list.

Furthermore, Russett broke defense spending down into three

components:

prime contracts by state, DOD civilian payrolls by state,

and DOD military payrolls by state.

Also, Russett used different

statistical methods than Cobb did.
Russett's conclusions are very different.

He found that votes

on defense expenditure bills and other defense and foreign policy
issues were highly correlated with each other.
correlations between general defense
control programs (of interest to

Surprisingly the

votes and votes on

the civilian aerospace

NASA andgun
and arms

‘''Cobb, "Defense Spending and Foreign Policy," p. 368.
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manufacturing industries) were very weak.

In addition, those senators

who were "hawks" in the 87th Congress were still "hawks" in the 90th,
and the same was true for the "doves."
As far as defense spending per state and the voting of the senators
on defense legislation were concerned, the breaking down of defense
spending into the three categories mentioned previously revealed some
startling findings.

In both Congresses, military spending for local de

fense bases was far more effective in influencing senators' votes on
defense-related legislation than was military spending for local prime
contracts:
The industrial part [of the 'military-industrial complex']
— that is, the big manufacturing establishments— does
not reinforce the hawkish or uncompromisingly anticommunist
forces in this country in any strong, simple, or direct way. . .
But the political effect of that spending is not the same as
that of money spent to maintain a large army of many men, with
bases scattered freely across the country.
Thus, ". . . Department of Defense expenditures for military installa
tions go to support and reinforce, if not to promote, a set of hawkish
2
and strongly anticommunist postures in American political life."

Russett also found that although during the 1950's Democrats were
3
more supportive of defense measures than were Republicans, the
situation had changed in the 1960's:
In the two congresses from the 1960's looked at here,
only a few of the strongest doves were Republicans or
southerners, and with only a single exception (and

^Russett, Price, p. 85.
2

Ibid. , p. 75.

3
Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in
National Politics (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1961),
pp. 251-59. (Hereinafter referred to as Common Defense.)
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that only in the 90th Congress) all the 20 to 25 most
^
hawkish senators were Republicans or southern Democrats.
Thus he concluded that during the 1960's Northern Democrats were
generally much less hawkish than were either Republicans or Southern
Democrats.

The Problem

These four investigators have attempted to determine what variables
have influenced legislative behavior in national security affairs.

This

paper will also explore this topic by examining the relationship bet
ween the House of Representatives and the military through analysis of
certain variables and various roll call votes.

The House rather than

the Senate was chosen because no recent studies have been done on House
members in the national security legislation area, particularly since
the United States' increased involvement in the war in Southeast Asia.
Also the political effects may be stronger, since House members must run
for re-election every two years from more homogeneous and smaller areas.
The writer proposes a set of hypotheses which seem reasonable.
They are presented in the next section.

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses have been proposed by the writer for
close examination.

They have been derived using independent variables

Russett, Price, p. 86.
^Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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from two categories:

structural features and external influences.

All

of these variables were examined in the four studies mentioned previously,
and some were found to be very important with regards to voting behavior
on national security issues.

The hypotheses will be analyzed through

the use of particular roll call votes and other relevant data.
Structural feature hypotheses: Structural features are those
characteristics within the governmental system, such as President, party,
and committee, which may influence legislators' votes on national
security (or any other) issues.

Using committee membership and political

party as the independent variables and voting outcome as the dependent
variable, these particular hypotheses will be tested:
1.

Committee members are more likely to vote for defenserelated proposals than are non-committee members.

2.

Democrats are more likely to be pro-defense than are
Republicans.

External influence hypotheses: Two external influences which may
be related to the voting patterns on defense issues are region and
constituency economic interests in defense policies.

Accordingly,

these hypotheses will be tested:
1.

Southerners are more likely to vote for defenserelated measures than are representatives from the
other sections of the country.

2.

The more defense installations a congressional
district has, the more "hawkish" its representative
will be.

3.

The more defense contracts a congressional district
receives, the more likely its representative will be
to vote for defense-related programs.

In addition, the technique of subclassification will be used to
hold third variables constant while examining the relationship between
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two other particular variables.
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CHAPTER I I

METHODOLOGY AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SUBJECTS

Sources of Data

Subjects of the study: The subjects of this study were the members
of the House of Representatives during the years 1961 (87th Congress,
1st session) and 1968 (90th Congress, 2nd session).
were chosen for two main reasons:

These two years

(1) these years are separate enough

to reveal any changes in attitudes toward defense issues which may have
occurred within the decade and (2) in each year the same party (the
Democrats) controlled both the executive and legislative branches of
the government, thus avoiding additional complications that would result
in the analysis.^

Also, Russett's study included the same time periods

but was on the Senate.
For both years, not all of the House members were included in this
study.

Because this paper depended heavily upon roll call votes,

absences on roll calls were regarded as missing data (Pairs and announce
ments were considered the same as "yea" and "nay" responses by legis
lators to roll calls). The following rule was applied when investigating
the voting records of the congressmen:

"If a legislator fails to

respond on one-half or more of the votes, he is not assigned a scale

Ibid., p. 30.
27
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position."

1

Thus of the 437 House members in 1961,

2

3 congressmen

(Representatives Eugene Siler of Kentucky, Joe Waggonner Jr. of Louisi
ana and Sam Rayburn of Texas [Speaker of the House]) were eliminated from
this study because they failed to respond to 50 percent or more of the
roll calls selected, leaving 434 congressmen to be studied.

Likewise

for 1968, 430 congressmen were included in the study with 4 members
(Representatives Cecil King of California, George Hansen of Idaho, John
Conyers Jr. of Michigan, and John McCormack of Massachusetts [Speaker
of the House]) and a vacant seat being dropped for lack of enough roll
call data.

Therefore this study included almost all of the House

members for both years.
Roll calls - general:

The roll call data, found in the annual

3
publications of the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, represent the
public records of how the representatives stood on various political
issues.

Roll call data are very reliable because, "They do not depend

for their validity as data upon verbal reports of action or upon the
impressions of fallible observers."^

Roll call votes also occur

Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox,
Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern Univer
sity Press, 1966), p. 109.
2

The membership totalled 437 in 1961 because two additional seats
had temporarily been added for the representatives from the new states
of Alaska and Hawaii, until later redistricting forced the number of
House seats back to 435.
3
The roll calls selected for analysis in this paper are found in
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XVII (Washington, D. C.: Congressional
Quarterly Inc., 1961), 505-63 and Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XXIV
(Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968), 1H-100H.
4
David B. Truman, The Congressional Party:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), p. 12.

A Case Study (New York:
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frequently enough on most matters to indicate the different views of the
representatives.
This study was limited to analyzing the roll calls in 1961 and
1968 on national security or defense-related legislation.

Unlike Bozik

and Cobb, who only investigated military legislation and foreign policy
votes in their respective studies, the writer broadly defined the term
national security legislation to include votes on such topics as the NASA
budget and the Peace Corps, as well as foreign policy and military
legislation votes (The roll calls chosen will be presented in the next
two sections.).

Using Guttman scale analysis, the writer found that for

both years all of the roll call votes included (with one exception)
measured one variable, support for defense-related proposals (A brief
description of Guttman scaling will be presented later in this chapter.).
Furthermore, the use of many roll calls revealed distinct differences
among the legislators in their support of defense-related measures.
Another reason for including a variety of issues under the defenserelated legislation category was that generally military bills (mili
tary construction appropriations, military procurement appropriations,
and Department of Defense appropriations) were not very controversial.
In this paper a bill was considered controversial if at least 20 percent
voted against the majority (This Guttman scaling procedure was followed
with some exceptions, these exceptions being roll call votes which the
writer felt should be included because of their particular relevance
for this study.).

This was probably because a vote against a bill for

national defense would be considered unpatriotic and politically unwise.
But while general defense bills were noncontroversial, particular parts
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of these bills were subjected to debate and amendments, indicating
differences among the legislators.
types of votes.

But there were very few of these

So roll call votes on other legislation affecting the

national security were also included to make the research results more
statistically and politically meaningful.

The writer felt that the same

pressures which a constituency may put on its congressman in the
domestic defense area would also be expected to influence his voting on
other national security issues.

Thus if the independent variables were

found to be highly correlated with the voting on the roll calls used
in this study, this would be similar to a defense spending-defense
appropriations voting relationship.
Throughout this paper the words liberal, conservative, hawk, and
dove will be used.

Using the definitions of Safire, in this study the

liberals or doves were those who believed, 11. . . i n accommodation . . .
as the route to peace, . . . ," while the conservatives or "war hawks"
2
were those who were, " . . . bellicose statesmen; . . ."

Thus, in this

study liberals were anti-defense or less supportive of defense legisla
tion while conservatives were pro-defense or more supportive of defense
measures.

In the next two sections of this chapter, the writer will

indicate what he felt was a liberal and a conservative vote on each roll
call analyzed.

Hfilliam Safire, The New Language of Politics: An Anecdotal Dic
tionary of Catchwords, Slogans, and Political Usage (New York: Random
House, Inc., 1968), p. 120.
^Ibid., p. 477.
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Roll calls - 1961: Before examining the roll call votes selected
for 1961, a brief review of some of the year's events is necessary.
This was the first year of the Kennedy Administration, and it was a
year of crises.

In April the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion took place,

resulting in a loss in American prestige.

Tension increased between

East and West over Berlin, leading to President Kennedy's request to
Congress for additional defense funds.

In August the East Germans

began building the Berlin Wall, with President Kennedy responding by
sending more U. S. troops into West Berlin.

The Russians added further

to the crisis by resuming the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere
in September and October.

The President then ordered the resumption of

United States underground tests in September.

The confrontation

between East and West over Berlin eased somewhat towards the end of the
year.

Also, the situation in Laos continued to worsen.
The 17 roll calls included in this study for 1961^ reflected

this tense period.

No real dovish pieces of legislation (in this

writer's opinion) were found in this set of roll calls (see Table 1).
On the most liberal vote (Congressional Quarterly [CQ] vote number
49) , 41 percent of the House members cast (or announced) an anti
defense vote, which did not help differentiate the extreme doves from
the moderate ones.

On the other hand, the most conservative vote (CQ

vote number 92) isolated the extreme hawks (depending on their other
roll call votes), with 81 percent of the membership voting anti-defense

The roll call votes are found in Congressional Quarterly Almanac,
XVII, 505-63.
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TABLE 1.— Roll Calls on National Security Legislation in the House of
Representatives, 1961a

.

C£ Vote No.

Vote
(Yeas-Nays)

12.

269-145
(276-148)c

21.

329-83
(339-88)

43.

292-63
(334-69)

49.

173-239
(181-249)

61.

241-170
(253-174)

75.

287-140
(293-141)
260-132
(279-153)

87.

88.

243-151
(262-165)

89.

270-123
(289-138)
329-66
(352-69)

92.

Bill

HR 5000. Amendment to the military con
struction authorization bill to remove
the authorization of funds provided for
the relocation of an Army Quartermaster
Depot.
HR 6518. Appropriation of $500 million
for the Inter-American Social and Econo
mic Cooperation Program and $100 million
for the Chilean Reconstruction and Re
habilitation Program.
HR 7712. Appropriation of $47.2 million
for fiscal 1961 for the Departments of
State, Justice, Treasury, and Defense,
$32.2 million of which was to pay the
U. S. assessment for the UN action in the
Congo.
HR 7851. Amendment to the defense appro
priations bill for fiscal 1962 to delete
a provision in the defense budget pro
hibiting price differentials in favor of
economically depressed areas.
HR 8302. Amendment to the military con
struction appropriation bill to eliminate
funds provided for the relocation of an
Army Quartermaster Depot.
HR 8400. The 1961 foreign aid authori
zation.
S 1983. Adoption of the conference re
port on the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 authorizing $4.2 billion in fiscal
1962 for foreign aid and $1.5 billion
for development loans in each of the
following four years.
HR 9033. Amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Appropriation Act of 1961 in
creasing the military aid appropriation
from $1.3 billion to $1.6 billion in
fiscal 1962.
HR 9033. Passage of the Foreign Assis
tance Appropriation Act of 1961.
HR 8666. Bill to consolidate and expand
U. S. educational and cultural exchange
programs.
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"TABLE 1.— Continued"

C£ Vote No.u

Vote
(Yeas-Nays)

93.

212-185
(230-197)

99.

288-97
(313-114)
290-54
(333-68)
253-79
(302-102)
253-50
(317-65)

107.
108.
113.

115.

192-81
(267-133)

116.

152-119
(187-175)

Bill

HR 8302. Motion to disagree with a Senate
amendment allowing funds for the trans
fer of an Army Quartermaster Depot.
HR 7500. Passage of the Peace Corps
Act.
S 2180. Bill to establish a U. S.
Arms Control Agency.
HR 7500. Adoption of the conference
report on the Peace Corps Act.
HR 9118. Adoption of the conference
report on the establishment of a U. S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
HR 9033. Adoption of the conference
report on the Foreign Assistance Appro
priation Act for fiscal 1962.
HR 9033. Agree with a Senate amend
ment allowing the President to with
hold foreign aid information requested
by Congress if he deems it necessary.

^ h e roll calls are found in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XVII
(Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1961), 505-63.
CQ is an abbreviation for Congressional Quarterly.
c
The figures in parentheses represent the number of representa
tives for and against a bill respectively when pairs and announcements
are included.
on the roll call (Unanimous and near unanimous roll call votes were
omitted from this study.).
On all of the 17 roll call votes selected for 1961, a "yea" vote
was considered to be a liberal response while a "nay" vote was consider
ed to be conservative.

This was based on certain assumptions.

general overall assumption was made for both years:

One

that the liberals

were internationalists, favoring government involvement and spending
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abroad with a little libertarian suspicion of too big a defense effort
at home, whereas the conservatives had isolationist tendencies, with some
conservatives even calling for the United States to leave the United
Nations.

On the foreign aid roll calls (CQ vote numbers 21, 75, 87, 88,

89, and 115) it was assumed that the liberals would vote for foreign aid
proposals while the conservatives would vote against them.

On the

Senate amendment on the withholding of foreign aid information (CQ
vote number 116) it was felt that the liberals would vote to increase
the President's powers in foreign affairs while the conservatives would
not.

Liberals would vote for the establishment of a United States

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and a Peace Corps (CQ vote numbers
107, 113, 99, and 108), whereas conservatives would oppose these pro
grams.

Liberals, unlike conservatives, would also vote' for funds for

the Congo operation and United States educational and cultural exchange
programs (CQ vote numbers 43 and 92).

On domestic military measures

it was assumed that the liberals would vote for the proposed amendments
to the military construction bills to prevent the transfer of an Army
Quartermaster Depot (CQ vote numbers 12, 61, and 93) to express opposi
tion to a questionable recommendation made by the Defense Department.
Finally, it was assumed that the liberals would vote for an amendment
to the defense appropriations bill (CQ vote number 49) which would help
"economically depressed areas."
Roll calls - 1968: In the year 1968 many important events took
place.

The Vietnam war continued to remain a key foreign policy issue

for the United States, with U. S. troop strength in Vietnam increasing
to over 500,000 men by the end of the year.

In February the "Tet"
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offensive occurred, during which the Vietcong attacked almost all of
South Vietnam’s provincial capitals.

These attacks were very effective

and led to the questioning of United States military progress in Vietnam.
Increased opposition to the Administration's Vietnam policy helped lead
to President Lyndon Johnson's announcement in March of a bombing halt
over much of North Vietnam and his decision to drop out of the Presiden
tial race to spend his full time seeking peace.

The Paris peace talks

between the United States and North Vietnam began in May, but very
little progress was achieved during the year.
the United States continued to occur throughout

Anti-war protests in
the year, with one of

the most widely publicized demonstrations coming at the Chicago
Democratic National Convention in August.

In November all American

bombing of North Vietnam was suspended, but the peace talks still
remained stalled.

In another foreign policy area relations between the

United States and the Soviet Union improved somewhat during the first
half of the year.

But the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in August

led to new tensions and the postponement of the

nuclear arms talks and

of cuts in the number of U. S. troops stationed in Europe.
Despite the controversy over the Vietnam war, no single signifi
cant roll call vote was taken on the Vietnam issue in Congress during
1968.

However, unlike 1961, the 20 roll calls selected for this study
1
for 1968 included a wide range of proposals, some extremely dovish and

some extremely hawkish (see Table 2).

On the most liberal vote (CQ

■*The roll call votes are found in Congressional Quarterly Almanac,
XXIV, 1H-100H.
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TABLE 2.— Roll Calls on National Security Legislation in the House of
Representatives, 1968a

C£ Vote No.

8.

Vote
(Yeas-Nays)

164-232
(178-245)C

23.

241-162
(254-173)

24.

305-96
(321-100)

29.

126-271
(133-287)

58.

262-106
(294-112)

66.

269-90
(314-106)

102.

218-163
(240-189)

104.

180-187
(201-215)

105.

293-61
(338-70)

Bill

HR 6649. Motion to recommit the Export-Import Bank extension bill with
instructions to cut by $1 billion the
increase in the limit on lending au
thority provided by the bill.
HR 14940. Motion to recommit the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency bill
with instructions to reduce a threeyear, $33-million authorization to a
two-year, $20 million authorization.
HR 14940. Passage of the bill to
extend the life of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency through June
30, 1970, and to authorize $20 million
in appropriations.
HR 15364. Motion to recommit (kill)
the Inter-American Development Bank
bill to provide for increased U. S.
participation in the Inter-American
Development Bank.
HR 15856. Passage of the bill author
izing appropriations of $4 billion for
the National Aeronautics and Space Ad
ministration in fiscal 1969.
HR 14940. Adoption of the conference
report on the Arms Control and Disarm
ament Agency bill extending the Agency’s
life for two years and authorizing
$18.5 million for the two-year period.
HR 16162. Amendment to the Export-Import Bank bill to limit to $100 million
the amount of losses which the U. S.
Treasury would be authorized to cover
in excess of $100 million in losses
incurred by the Export-Import Bank.
HR 15087. Motion to recommit the Peace
Corps authorization bill with instruc
tions to reduce the authorization for
fiscal 1969 appropriations from $112.8
million to $97 million.
HR 15087. Passage of the Peace Corps
authorization bill authorizing $112.8
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"TABLE 2.— Continued"

C£ Vote No.

Vote
(Yeas-Nays)

144.

283-118
(299-119)

145.

268-150
(275-157)

146.

228-184
(238-194)
32-350
(37-377)

162.

174.
176.

312-29
(357-31)
73-268
(81-302)

197.

196-151
(238-186)

198.

293-58
(326-64)

199.

270-64
(315-69)

200.

174-138
(234-191)

Bill

million for the Peace Corps in fiscal
1969.
HR 15263. Adoption of the rule allow
ing three hours of debate on the For
eign Assistance Act of 1968 and per
mitting amendments.
HR 15263. Motion to recommit the
fiscal 1969 foreign aid authorization
bill with instructions to cut an
additional $165 million from the author
ization.
HR 15263. Passage of the fiscal 1969
foreign aid authorization bill.
HR 18785. Motion to recommit the
military construction appropriations
bill for fiscal 1969.
HR 15681. Passage of the Foreign Mili
tary Sales Act of 1968.
HR 18707. Amendment to the fiscal 1969
Defense Appropriations Act prohibiting
the use of funds in the bill for the
purchase of aircraft or aircraft parts
from overseas firms.
HR 15263. Adoption of the conference
report on the foreign aid authorization
bill authorizing $2 billion in foreign
economic and military aid for fiscal 1969.
HR 19908. Adoption of the motion to
consider the resolution (H Res 1308)
waiving points of order against HR 19908,
appropriating $1.6 billion for foreign
aid in fiscal 1969.
HR 19908. Motion to begin immediate
consideration of the fiscal 1969 foreign
aid appropriations bill.
HR 19908. Passage of the foreign aid
appropriations bill appropriating $1.6
billion for foreign aid in fiscal 1969.
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"TABLE 2.— Continued"

C£ Vote No.

231.

Vote
(Yeas-Nays)

125-93
(227-183)

Bill

HR 19908. Adoption of the conference
report on the fiscal 1969 foreign aid
appropriations bill appropriating $1.8
billion for foreign economic and mili
tary aid in fiscal 1969.

g
The roll calls are found in Congressional Quarterly Almanac,
XXIV (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968), 1H10OH.
^CQ is an abbreviation for Congressional Quarterly,
c
The figures in parentheses represent the number of representa
tives for and against a bill respectively when pairs and announcements
are included.
vote number 162) , only 8 percent of the House members cast (or announced)
an anti-defense vote, helping to indicate those who probably were the
extreme doves (depending on their other roll call votes). On the other
hand, the most conservative vote (CQ vote number 174) isolated the
extreme hawks (again depending on their other roll call votes), with
83 percent of the membership voting anti-defense on the roll call (Un
animous and near unanimous roll call votes were omitted from this
study.).
On 12 of the 20 roll call votes selected for 1968 a "yea" vote was
considered to be a liberal response while a "nay" vote was considered
conservative.

On the other 8 roll calls the situation was reversed,

with a "nay" response standing for liberal and "yea" for conservative.
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This again was based on certain assumptions.

With regards to the

foreign aid roll calls, it was assumed that the liberals would vote
for foreign aid (voting "yea" on CQ vote numbers 146, 197, 200, and 231
and "nay" on CQ vote number 145) while the conservatives would oppose
foreign aid and vote for cuts in it.

This would also apply to the pro

cedural votes on foreign aid bills, with liberals voting for immediate
consideration of foreign aid measures (voting "yea" on CQ vote numbers
144, 198, and 199) and conservatives voting for more time.

On the

Export-Import Bank and Inter-American Development Bank bills, it was
assumed that liberals would vote against limiting the activities of these
institutions (voting "nay" on CQ vote numbers 8, 29, and 102) while
conservatives would vote otherwise.

On the bill authorizing credit

sales of U. S. military equipment abroad (CQ vote number 174) it was
assumed that the liberals would vote "yea" and the conservatives "nay"
on the proposal.

On the "buy America" proposal (CQ vote number 176) the

liberals would vote against ("nay") the bill while the conservatives
would vote for it ("yea"). Liberals would also vote for more funds
for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Peace Corps (voting
"nay" on QQ vote numbers 23 and 104 and "yea" on CQ vote numbers 24,
66, and 105) while conservatives would vote for less money for these
agencies.

On domestic measures the writer assumed that the liberals

would vote against ("nay") the NASA budget (CQ vote number 58) and for
("yea") a motion to recommit the military construction appropriations
bill (CQ vote number 162) while the conservatives would vote otherwise.
Installation and plant data: One of the topics which will be
explored in this paper will be whether constituency economic interests
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in defense policies were related to the voting patterns on defense
issues.

Constituency economic interests were defined in this study as

consisting of those economic benefits (money, jobs, and customers) in
an area which were derived from defense activities.

These constituency

interests, which vary in amount from one House district to another,
can be greatly affected by changes in national security policies.

For

example, a cut in the defense budget may result in the closing of some
military bases.

The constituency interests were measured in this

study using two different classifications:

the number of major military

installations and the number of major private defense plants in each
congressional district.

These indicators were used because, unlike

state figures, the data on Department of Defense expenditures by con
gressional district are not available, and the subcontracting patterns
are classified information.

Therefore, the number of major government

military installations and private defense plants located in each
congressional district were used as indications of how much defense
money was being spent in each of the districts."^

The sources used to calculate the number of installations and
plants located in each of the congressional districts were as follows:
"The 'Military Lobby'— Its Impact on Congress, Nation," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report, XIX (March 24, 1961), 472-78; Fortune 1961
Plant and Product Directory of the 500 Largest U. S. Industrial Cor
porations (New York: Time, Inc., 1961), Geographical Section; Richard
M. Scammon, comp, and ed., America Votes 4; A Handbook of Contemporary
American Election Statistics (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press for the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1962), pp. 1-457; Congres
sional Directory, 87th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 1-180; "The Military-Industrial
Complex: A Problem for the Secretary of Defense," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report, XXVI, special report (May 24, 1968), 1168-178;
Fortune 1966 Plant and Product Directory of the 1,000 Largest U. S.
Industrial Corporations (New York: Time, Inc., 1966) , Geographical
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This procedure took into account the differences in defense spend
ing in the various parts of the larger states, which Cobb failed to do
and therefore, " . . . washed out much of the variation in his indepen
dent variable, and thus failed to find a correlation that would other
wise have appeared."'*'

Since the employment figures for each military

installation and private plant (employees doing defense work only) are
also not available, the installations and plants data do not give a
completely accurate picture of the amount of money spent and the number
of people employed by the Defense Department in each district.

Thus

only a few people might be stationed at one military base while
thousands (including both military and civilian personnel) might be
employed at another.

The assumption was that the more major military

Section; Richard M. Scammon, comp, and ed., America Votes 8 ; A Handbook
of Contemporary American Election Statistics (Washington, D. C. : Congres
sional Quarterly for the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1970), pp. 1433; Congressional Directory, 90th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 1-196; Rand McNally Road
Atlas, United States, Canada, Mexico (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Company,
1971), pp. 1-91. It should be emphasized that many modifications were
made in the Congressional Quarterly lists, which served as the main
sources of the data, by using the congressional district boundary lines
and maps found in the Congressional Directory (-ies) and Scammon and the
city maps found in the Rand McNally Road Atlas. This was done to try
to determine exactly in which congressional district each military instal
lation and defense plant was located, and thus keep the data for both
years relatively comparable (In the 1968 Congressional Quarterly data
some bases and plants were listed several times,'thus placing them in two
or more congressional districts rather than just one). But because of
several difficulties (such as the lack of adequate maps or addresses);
some installations and plants were placed in more than one district, thus
being counted more than once in the data. Also, inactive bases were not
included in the data.
‘'’Bruce M[artin] Russett, "Communications," Journal of Conflict
Resolution, XIV (June, 1970), 289.
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installations and defense plants a district had ". .
visibility [of] the 'defense interest."1^

the greater

Despite these limitations,

the data used might reveal some of the effects of defense spending on
House members.

Tables 3 and 4 show the distribution of House

TABLE 3.— Distribution of House Constituencies of Numbers of Military
Installations, by Number and Percentage of Districts, 1961 and 1968

Number of
Installations

1968

1961
Number

Percentage

Number

Percentage

None

175

40.32

201

46.74

1

121

27.88

101

23.49

2

54

12.44

60

13.95

3 or more

84

19.35

68

15.82

434

99.99

430

100.00

Total

a
Calculated from: "The 'Military Lobby'— Its Impact on Congress,
Nation," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XIX (March 24, 1961),
472-78; Richard M. Scammon, comp, and ed., America Votes 4; A Hand
book of Contemporary American Election Statistics (Pittsburgh: Univer
sity of Pittsburgh Press for the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1962) ,
pp. 1-457; Congressional Directory, 87th Congress, 1st Session (Washing
ton, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 1-180; "The
Military-Industrial Complex: A Problem for the Secretary of Defense,"
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XXVI, special report (May 24,
1968) , 1168-178; Richard M. Scammon, comp, and ed., America Votes 8 ;
A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics (Washington, D. C.:
Congressional Quarterly for the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1970) ,
pp. 1-433; Congressional Directory, 90th Congress, 2nd Session (Washing
ton, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 1-196; Rand McNally
Road Atlas, United States, Canada, Mexico (Chicago: Rand, McNally &
Company, 1971), pp. 1-91.

^Mitchell, "Legislative Decision-Making," p. 389.
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constituencies, by number and percentage, among the four categories

for

military installations and private defense plants respectively.
TABLE 4.— Distribution of House Constituencies of Numbers of Private
Defense Plants, by Number and Percentage of Districts, 1961 and 1968

1961

Number of
Plants
Number

1968
Percentage

Number

Percentage

225

51.84

204

47.44

1

95

21.89

105

24.42

2

41

9.45

47

10.93

3 or more

73

16.81

74

17.21

434

99.99

430

100.00

None

Total

Calculated from: "The 'Military Lobby'— Its Impact on Congress,
Nation," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XIX (March 24, 1961) ,
472-78; Fortune 1961 Plant and Product Directory of the 500 Largest U. S.
Industrial Corporations (New York: Time, Inc., 1961), Geographical Sec
tion; Richard M. Scammon, comp, and ed., America Votes 4; A Handbook of
Contemporary American Election Statistics (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press for theGovernmental Affairs Institute, 1962), pp. 1-457;
Congressional Directory, 87th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 1-180; "The Military-Industrial Com
plex: A Problem for the Secretary of Defense," Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report, XXVI, special report (May 24, 1968), 1168-178; Fortune 1966
Plant and Product Directory of the 1,000 Largest U. S. Industrial Corpora
tions (New York: Time, Inc., 1966), Geographical Section; Richard M. Scammon,
comp, and ed., America Votes 8 ; A Handbook of Contemporary American Election
Statistics (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly for the Governmental
Affairs Institute, 1970), pp. 1-433; Congressional Directory, 90th Congress,
2nd Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 1196; Rand McNally Road Atlas, United States, Canada, Mexico (Chicago: Rand,
McNally & Company, 1971), pp. 1-91.

^"Only four categories were used to prevent distortions in the other
statistical figures sought in this study.
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Research Procedure

All of the data gathered for this study were put on punchcards so
that the calculations involved could be done by computer.

One punchcard

was used for each congressman, and two separate decks of punchcards were
created, one deck containing the 1961 data and the other 1968 data.

Be

sides the roll call, installation, and plant data mentioned in the pre
vious sections, each congressman's region, political party, and committee
membership were also included on each individual punchcard.
The roll call data were recorded on the punchcards in a particular
manner.

For each year the roll call with the lowest liberal vote (the most

liberal proposal) was put in the first column of those used for recording
the roll call data.

The roll call with the second lowest liberal vote was

put in the second column and so on, until the last column used contained the
roll call with the highest liberal vote (the most conservative proposal).
Thus, on each punchcard a congressman's individual voting record was record
ed (0 for conservative, 1 for liberal, and 2 for not voting), indicating his
votes on all of the roll calls used, from the most liberal to the most con
servative.

Characteristics of the Subjects

Almost all of the congressmen for both years were included in this
study.

Thus the findings in this paper will apply to the entire member

ship of the House for both years.

Due to the element of time, only

certain characteristics of the congressmen were selected for analysis.
The characteristics chosen were:

voting records, region, political party,

committee membership, and constituency economic interests.
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Classification of the congressmen’s voting records:

In the previous

sections on the roll call data the writer indicated what he felt was a
liberal and a conservative vote on each roll call.

But in both of the years

studied, very few congressmen cast either all liberal or all conservative
votes on every roll call selected for that year.

So the congressmen for

each year were divided into groups along a liberal-conservative scale, using
their individual voting records.

Each congressman was put into one of these

groups or scale types according to his scale score.

This scale score was a

two column figure representing the number of liberal votes a congressman
had cast on the roll calls for one year.

Since l's were used on the punch

cards to indicate liberal votes, the scale scores for 1961 ranged from 00
(a perfect conservative score) to 16 (a perfect liberal score).’*' Likewise,
for 1968 the scale scores went from 00 (a perfect conservative score) to
20 (a perfect liberal score).

In determining the scale score for each

congressman, the following procedure was used in dealing with non-scale
responses (absences and errors):
All of the men casting non-scale votes can now be scored.
The general rule here is that such people are scored with the
group with, whom they can be placed with a minimum number of
alterations in their voting patterns. If the same number of
alterations can place a man in either of two positions^he is
placed nearest the mean score of the entire population.
Thus to take a very simple example, a legislator with a voting record of
0100 (0 for conservative and 1 for liberal) would be given a scale

1
Congressional Quarterly vote number 12 was omitted because Guttman
scaling showed that the votes on this roll call did not scale with the
other roll call votes in measuring a single variable. Thus only 16 roll
calls were used for 1961.
2

George M. Belknap, "A Method for Analyzing Legislative Behavior,"
Midwest Journal of Political Science, II (November, 1958), 397.
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score of 0 and be placed in the same scale type containing legislators
with a 0000 voting record (0000 representing an example of a perfect
voting pattern for scaling purposes).
In Table 5 shown below, the congressmen of 1961 were placed among
a scale consisting of five scale types.

Those most inclined to support

domestic defense measures and to oppose spending programs abroad (the
conservatives) were placed in scale type 0.

Going from the top to the

bottom of the table, the scale scores increase (Column 3), and the scale
types (Column 1) represent more liberal groups until scale type 4 is
reached, consisting of the most liberal House members.

The roll calls

(Column 4) go from the first vote, the most conservative (CQ vote number
92), to the last one, the most liberal
meaningful finding of the scale
extremes (Column 2).

(CQ vote number 49).

The most

is the clustering that occurs at the

Almost 43 percent of the legislators occupy scale

types 0 and 4 while only a little under 21 percent are found in the
center at type 2.

Thus there was much polarization in the voting on the

various issues included in this
In Table 6 a scale made up

set of roll calls.
of six scale types was constructed to

help classify the House members of 1968.

Just as in Table 5, the most

extreme groups of congressmen are located at the top (type 0 , most
conservative) and the bottom (type 5, most libera]), with the more moder
ate groups of legislators in the middle (Column 1).

The roll calls

(Column 4) again go from the most conservative (CQ vote number 174)
to the most liberal (CQ vote number 162).

But unlike the 1961 data,

only a little less than 22 percent of the House members occupy the
extremes (scale types 0 and 5) while almost 39 percent are found in the
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TABLE 5.— National Security Liberal-Conservative Scale, 1961.

Number Placed
in Scale Type
(2)

Scale
Scores
(3)

0

93

00-05

92,21,43,107,113

1

74

06-11

99,108,75,89,87,115

2

90

12

3

84

13-15

4

«*3

16

Scale Type3
(1)

Not classified
Total

b
CQ Vote Nos.
(4)

88
61,93,116
49

3
• •

437
.

..

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 4).
CQ is an abbreviation for Congressional Quarterly,
middle categories (scale types 2 and 3, Column 2).

This may be

partially due to the existence of more extreme proposals in the set of
roll call votes selected for 1968.

But it is mainly because the

writer deliberately chose to isolate the most extreme members of the
House for testing purposes.
To show how the roll calls were assigned to different scale
types, the writer has drawn a mini-scale pattern in the illustration
following Table 6 (0 for conservative and 1 for liberal), using some of
the roll calls from 1961.

The roll call votes were assigned to scale

types using the voting patterns on the roll calls.

Therefore a

congressman in scale type 0 in 1961 had a certain pattern of responses
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TABLE 6.— National Security Liberal-Conservative Scale, 1968

Number Placed
in Scale Type
(2)

Scale
Scores
(3)

b
CQ Vote Nos.
(4)

0

58

00-03

174,105,198

1

70

04-08

24,199,66,176,144

2

71

09-13

29,8,197,146,200

3

95

14-17

231,104,102,23

4

100

18

5

36

19-20

Scale Typea
(1)

Not classified

Total

145
58,162

5

435

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 5) .
b
CQ is an abbreviation for Congressional Quarterly.

92

99

88

61

49

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

to the roll call votes, mostly consisting of non-liberal votes.
The scales in Tables 5 and 6 will be used in various tests in the
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next two chapters of this paper.
Region and party: In social science literature there have been
many definitions of what states make up what regions.

Such various

criteria as terrain, crops or industry, climate, boundaries of poli
tical units, and past historical events have been used to define
1
regions.
The writer chose to use the regional definitions of the U. S.
Bureau of the Census in this study, dividing the country into four
sections:

Northeast, South, North Central, and West.

2

In all there

are nine Northeastern, sixteen Southern, twelve North Central, and
thirteen Western states.
In Table 7 shown below, the number of House seats included in
each section is given, along with the proportional representation in
the House for each region in both years (based on 434 seats in 1961
and 430 seats in 1968),

All of the regions except the Western states

were major sections in the chamber for both years, with each containing
at least a fourth of the House membership (Columns 3 and 5).

In both

years the South represented the largest section in the House.

These

varying proportions must be kept in mind when examining each section's

^Mitchell, "Legislative Decision-Making," p. 356.
2

U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1970 (91st annual ed.; Washington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. xii. The states which
comprise these four regions are as follows: Northeast— Maine, New Hamp
shire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania; South— Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky,
Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and
Texas; North Central— Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin,
Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota^, Nebraska, and
Kansas; West— Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona,
Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, and Hawaii.
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impact on legislative affairs.
As far as the parties were concerned, the. Democrats held a majority
in the House for both years.

Excluding the congressmen omitted from

this study,"*" there were 261 Democrats and 173 Republicans in the House
in 1961, and 244 Democrats and 186 Republicans in 1968.
which sections the parties were strong.

Table 8 shows in

The Democratic party was very

strong in the South, with considerable strength also in the Northeastern
and the North Central states (Columns 3 and 5).
had its greatest strength in two sections:
Northeastern states (Columns 2 and 4).

The Republican party

the North Central and the

Of real significance also was

the increase in the number of Republican House seats in the South from
1961 to 1968, indicating the growth of a two-party system in the South.
Once again the Western states were a minor section in both parties,
just as they were in proportional legislative representation.
Both region and party will be tested against other variables in the
next two chapters of this paper.
Committee membership: Because congressional committees play
such an important role in the legislative process, particular atten
tion will be focused upon those congressmen who served on committees
which were concerned with national security policies.

More specifi

cally, the members of the House Armed Services committee and of the
Defense Appropriations and the Military Construction Appropriations
subcommittees of the House Appropriations committee will be studied
with special interest, since their committees deal directly

See the first section of this chapter.
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TABLE 7.— Sectional Representation of House Members, by Number and
Percentage, 1961 and 1968

1961

1968

Section
(1)

Number
(2)

Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

Northeast

115

26.50

106

24.65

South

131

30.18

133

30.93

North Central

129

29.72

124

28.84

59

13.59

67

15.58

434

99.99

430

100.00

West
Total

TABLE 8.— Sectional Representation of House Members within Each
Legislative Party, by Percentages, 1961 and 1968

1961*

1968b

Section
(1)
Northeast

Republicans
(2)

Democrats
(3)

Republicans
(4)

Democrats
(5)

34.1

21.5

23.1

25.8

5.8

46.4

17.7

41.0

North Central

45.1

19.5

43.0

18.0

West

15.0

12.6

16.1

15.2

100.0

100.0

99.9

100.0

South

Total

The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House members.
bThe 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House members,
with defense-related activities and programs.

Thus these congressmen

constituted the category of committee members while all other represen
tatives were considered non-committee members for the purposes of this
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study.
In analyzing the composition of these three defense-related commit
tees (one full committee and two subcommittees), some interesting
findings appear.

Taking the sectional representation data (Table 7,

Columns 3 and 5) and comparing them with the membership of the three
committees (combined), the writer found that no one region had a
consistent preponderant representation on these committees in both of
the years studied.

(Table 9).

In examining Columns 3 and 5 of Table

9, only one consistent result appears, and that is the underrepresen
tationof the North

Central states on these committees.

several reasons for this.

There may be

One explanation could be the absence of

a traditional economic interest in national security programs, military
bases, payrolls, and the like in the North Central states (More details
about this situation will be presented in the next section). Another
factor

could be the desire of House members from the North Central

states

to serveon other committees with different interests, such as

the Agriculture committee for example.

On the other hand, the Southern

and Western states may have been overrepresented on these committees
because these regions had an economic interest in defense programs, with
many military installations being located in coastal areas.
Constituency economic interests:

In Tables 3 and 4 the instal

lation and plant data were given, indicating the distribution of House
constituencies among the four categories for each variable.

In this

section the data will be broken down even further to show the patterns
in the distribution of these constituency economic interests according
to region and committee membership.
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TABLE 9.— Sectional Representation of House Members, Compared with the
Membership of Defense-Related Committees,3 by Percentages,
1961 and 1968

Section
(1)

19 Si0
Committee
Sectional
Representation
Difference
(3)
(2)

19(>8C
Committee
Sectional
Representation Different
(5)
(4)

Northeast

26.50

+0.40

24.65

-1.85

South

30.18

+8.32

30.93

+0.67

North Central

29.72

-8.52

28.84

-2.54

West

13.59

-0.09

15.58

+3.72

Total

99.99

100.00

The defense-related committees as defined in this study were the
House Armed Services committee and the Defense Appropriations and Military
Construction Appropriations subcommittees of the House Appropriations
committee.
b

There were 52 members on the 3 committees in 1961.

c
There were 57 members on the 3 committees in 1968.
The major military installations in the United States tended to be
concentrated in certain sections of the country, as shown in Table 10
below.

The table indicates the clustering of major military installa

tions in the Southern and Western states (Columns 3, 5, 7, and 9) while
about half or more of the House districts in the Northeastern and North
Central regions did not have any installations at all (Columns 2, 4, 6 ,
and 8).

This was true for both 1961 and 1968.

probably responsible for this situation:
and the main livelihood of its population.

Certain factors were

the location of a district
A district situated in a

remote location where farming was the main occupation tended not to
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TABLE 10.— Distribution of House Constituencies of Numbers of Military
Installations, by Region, 1961 and 1968 (by Percentage
of Districts)

Number of
Installations

(1)

196 8b

19613

NE
(2)

c
Region
NC
S
(4)
(3)

W
(5)

c
Ret;ion
NE S
NC
(6) (7)
(8)

W
(9)

None

46.1

34.4

51.2

18.6

56.6 38.3

62.1

19.4

1

25.2

28.2

33.3

20.3

20.£ 27.1

24.2

19.4

2

13.9

15.3

10.9

6.8

12.3 17.3

10.5

16.4

3 or more

14.8

22.1

4.7

54.2

10.4 17.3

3.2

44.8

100.0

100.0

100.1

99.9

100.1 100.(100.0

100.0

Total

a
The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House
members.
The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House
members.
c
The regions are abbreviated as follows:
South, NC for North Central, and W for West.

NE for Northeast, S for

attract defense bases as compared to a district near the coast which
contained a major urban center.

These two factors may help explain

why the North Central region has had a tradition of isolationism- in
foreign affairs in the past, and also why not as many representatives
from this region served on the defense-related committees included in
this study, compared with members from the other areas of the country
(using sectional representation statistics).
On the other hand, the major private defense plants in the
United States tended not to be as highly concentrated as the military
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installations were.

In Table 11 shown below, all of the regions except

for the South showed approximately the same pattern in the distribution
of House constituencies among the four plant classes in 1961 (Columns
2, 3, 4, and 5), with more clustering occurring in the more urban
Northeastern and Western regions (especially in California).

The

situation had changed somewhat by 1968, with an increasing amount of
defense work being done in both the South and the West (Columns 7 and 9).
The Southern increase may be largely the result of having a Southerner
in the White House:

"Under the Johnson administration defense spending

became an agent of redistribution of income in favor of some of the
poorer areas of the country, especially the South, and most particularly
Texas."

Despite this, the general patterns for the"location of

installations and plants were as follows:

"The distribution of contracts

is thus very different from that of military bases, the former. . .,
tending to favor some of the industrial states and the latter especially
2

heavy in Alaska, Hawaii, the South, and the Southwest."
There was also a slight difference between committee and non
committee members in the distribution of installations and plants in
their respective districts.

In Table 12 shown below, the figures indicate

that there tended to be a greater concentration of major military in
stallations in the districts of committee members (Columns 3 and 5)
than in those constituencies represented by non-committee members

■^Russett, Price, p. 69.
2

Ibid., p. 65.
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TABLE 11.— Distribution of House Constituencies of Numbers of Private De
fense Plants, by Region, 1961 and 1968 (be Percentage of
Districts)

1961*
Number of
Plants
NE
(2)

(1)

c
Efegion
S
NC
(3)
(4)

1968

W
(5)

NE
(6)

c
Region
S
NC
(7)
(8)

W
(9)

None

38.3

73.3

45.0

45.8

40.6

55.6

52.4

32.8

1

22.6

18.3

25.6

20.3

22.6

26.3

26.6

19.4

2

13.9

4.6

11.6

6.8

16.0

8.3

11.3

7.5

3 or more

25.2

3.8

17.8

27.1

20.8

9.8

9.7

40.3

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0 100.0

100.0

100.0

Total

^ h e 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House
members.
The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House
members.
Q

The regions are abbreviated as follows:
South, NC for North Central, and W for West.
(Columns 2 and 4).

NE for Northeast, S for

This trend had grown stronger by 1968, when almost

one third of the committee members had three or more major military
installations in their districts (Column 5).
Major private defense plants also tended to be more heavily con
centrated in the districts of committee members as opposed to those of
non-committee members, although not as much as was the case for military
installations.

In Table 13 shown below, it can be- seen that the

constituencies of committee members tended to have more defense plants
(proportionately) than did those of non-committee members.
relationship also had grown stronger by 1968.

This

Thus committee members
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TABLE 12.— Distribution of House Constituencies of Numbers of Military
Installations among Committee and Non-Committee Members,
by Percentage of Districts, 1961 and 1968
T>--

1961*

1968b

Number of
Installations
Non-Committee
Members
(2)

Committee
Members
(3)

Non-Committee
Members
(4)

Committee
Members
(5)

None

40.8

36.5

48.3

36.8

1

29.1

19.2

24.9

14.0

2

11.8

17.3

13.4

17.5

3 or more

18.3

26.9

13.4

31.6

100.0

99.9

100.0

99.9

(1)

Total

There were 52 committee and 382 non-committee members in 1961 as
defined in this study.
There were 57 committee and 373 non-committee members in 1968 as
defined in this study.
had somewhat of a greater than proportional constituency economic interest
in defense in their particular districts.

Furthermore, this interest had

increased from 1961 to 1968.

Statistical Measures

Before getting into more of the results of the study, a brief descrip
tion of the various statistical measures used in doing the research will be
presented in this section.

These measures included Guttman scaling, coeffi

cient of reproducibility, gamma correlation, and Pearson's contingency
coefficient (C).
Guttman scaling and coefficient of reproducibility: Guttman
scaling, which has been referred to previously in this paper, is an
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TABLE 13.— Distribution of House Constituencies of Numbers of Private De
fense Plants among Committee and Non-Committee Members, by
Percentage of Districts, 1961 and 1968

Number of
Plants
(1)

Non-Committee
Members
(2)

jl961a
Committee
Members
(3)

19j68b
Non-Committee
Members
(4)

Committee
Members
(5)

None

52.6

46.2

49.1

36.8

1

21.5

25.0

23.9

28.1

2

9.4

9.6

10.2

15.8

16.5

19.2

16.9

19.3

100.0

100.0

100.1

100.0

3 or more
Total

aThere were 52 committe e and 382 non-committee
defined in this study.

members in 1961 as

^There were 57 committee and 373 non-committee members in 1968 as
defined in this study.
attempt to study individual attitudes.

A Guttman scale is,

. . . a procedure (1) for ordering cases in terms of a
property conceived as unidimensional, which (2) com
bines multiple indicants (or items) into a composite
measure, and which at the same time (3) tests the assump
tion that these indicants do ’hang together’ to represent
a single dimension (or unitary concept).
In this study the voting patterns on two sets of roll calls (Tables 1
and 2) were examined to determine whether both sets were scalar (measured
one variable only).

As-mentioned earlier in this chapter, 16 out of the

17 roll calls for the first set (1961) formed a scalar pattern (CQ vote

Matilda White Riley, Sociological Research I: A Case Approach
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1963), p. 470.
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number 12 did not) while all 20 roll calls in the second group (1968)
measured a single variable.

Thus two Guttman scales were created, one

for each year, measuring one common variable— support for defense-related
legislation (see Tables 5 and 6).

Then the congressmen for each year

were placed along the respective scales according to their individual
scale scores, resulting in the distributions shown in Tables 5 and 6 .
The coefficients of reproducibility (which are measures of
deviation from a perfect scale) obtained for the two scales were:
0.91 for 1961 (using 16 roll calls) and 0.93 for 1968.

Conventionally,

a reproducibility of 0.90 is suggested as the minimum value necessary in
order for items to form an adequate Guttman scale.

2

Gamma correlation: Gamma is a measure of the degree of association
between two sets of ordered categories.

Gamma was especially appropri

ate for this study because of the numerous tied ranks involved in the
research, where all persons in the same category of a variable had the
same rank (tied ranks).
data

3

Gamma was used for data of two types:

and dichotomous data.

4

ordinal

Because the whole population of the House

The coefficients were calculated using the following formula:
CR = 1.00 - e/r, where CR = coefficient of reproducibility, e ■= errors,
and r = total number of responses.
2

Anderson, et. al. , Legislative Roll-Calls Analysis, p. 112.

3
Ordinal data are data rank-ordered on a characteristic or pro
perty according to the numbers that they carry. These numbers indicate
"greater than" or "less than" relationships among the data, but do not
specify "how much" difference exists between them. For example, in this
study the scale scores are ordinal data (see Tables 5 and 6), indicating
how liberal (or conservative) each House member was, but they do not
reveal whether the group of congressmen in 1968 who had scale scores of
19 were "closer" to those who had scores of 18 or those at 20, and so on
for all of the scale score groups in both years.
4
Dichotomous data are those data divided into two categories.
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for both years was included in this study (with the minor exceptions men
tioned previously) instead of just a sample of the House members, tests
of statistical significance for the gammas obtained were not run.
Generally, a gamma of between .000.301

.600

medium, and between

.300
j.601

is considered low, between
1.00C

high.

1

Pearson's contingency coefficient (£) : Because the whole popu
lation of the House was included in this study instead of just a sample,
the chi-square technique was not used.

But another measure of association

based on chi-square was employed— Pearson's contingency coefficient (C).
In order to be used, the contingency coefficient had to be modified:
Although the upper limit [of C] increases as the number
of rows and columns increases, this upper limit is
always less than one. For this reason, C is somewhat
more difficult to interpret than the other measures
unless a correction is introduced by dividing by the
maximum value of C for the particular numbers of rows
and columns.
Thus C' (the corrected value for the contingency coefficient) is
calculated by dividing the original contingency coefficient value obtain
ed by the maximum value of C.

The contingency coefficient was used for

two dichotomous variables used in this study were party and committee
membership.
"'’For more details about gamma see John H. Mueller, Karl F.
Schuessler, and Herbert L. Costner, Statistical Reasoning in Sociology
(2nd ed.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), pp. 279-90.
2

Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (New York:
Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), p. 230.

McGraw-

3

The formula for the maximum value of C is as follows: Cmax =
t-1, where Cmax = the maximum value of C and t = the number of cells
t
for rows ox_ columns (whichever is the larger number).

-\J
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nominal data.

No tests of statistical significance were run for the

contingency coefficients obtained, just as was the case for the gammas.
The results of the study pertaining to the hypotheses proposed in
Chapter I will be presented in the next two chapters.

These results,

along with the appropriate tables and gamma and contingency coefficient
statistics, were calculated using a modified version of the NUCROS
(computer) program.^

Nominal data are numbers used merely for identification purposes
and do not have a number meaning. They cannot be ordered or added at
all but act as labels for different groups. For example, in this study
the regions were assigned numbers as follows: Northeast, 1; South, 2;
North Central, 3; West, 4. Just because the West had a larger number
(4) than did the Northeast (1) did not mean that the Northeast was
valued less than the West. The numbers were used to classify the states
according to what region each one belonged to.
2

For more details on the NUCROS program see Kenneth Janda, Data
Processing: Applications to Political Research (2nd ed.; Evanston, 111.
Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp. 161-67.
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CHAPTER III

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP, POLITICAL PARTY, AND VOTING

Structural Features

In Chapter I various hypotheses were proposed for close examin
ation.

In this and the next chapter the findings of this study as

related to these hypotheses will be presented.

The two independent

variables falling under the category of structural features, committee
membership and political party, were investigated to determine whether
they were related to the dependent variable, voting outcome.

Structural

features, as mentioned in Chapter I, are those properties within the
governmental system which may have an effect on legislative voting on
national security issues.

The results of the analysis of the relation

ships between the independent variables and the dependent variable will
be presented in tables, along with the particular gamma values obtained.
Committee membership and voting: One of the two structural
feature variables used in this study was committee membership.

As

mentioned previously, the committees selected for analysis in this
paper were the House Armed Services committee and the Defense Appro
priations and the Military Construction Appropriations subcommittees of
the House Appropriations committee.

The hypothesis proposed was that

committee members tended to be more pro-defense than non-committee
members.

It was felt that the committee members, who were particularly

concerned with defense issues, would develop more favorable attitudes
toward defense needs and requests.

Also, as was determined earlier
62
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(Tables 12 and 13 in Chapter II), committee members had a greater than
proportional constituency economic interest: in defense (installations
and plants) in their particular districts.

Thus it was assumed that

these two factors would make committee members more inclined to vote
for defense-related proposals than non-committee members, since the
committee members might develop a special outlook on defense matters
because of their greater access to information and also since it may be
in their political interests to vote to get and keep economic benefits
for their respective constituencies.
The results obtained for this relationship (committee membership
and voting) are shown in Tables 14 and 15.

There was very little re

lationship between the variables in both years.

The gamma for Table

14 is .271 while for Table 15 the gamma is only .158.

Although the

association is positive, the gammas are too low to be considered mean
ingful.

Furthermore, the value of gamma decreased from 1961 to 1968

despite the fact that the committee members' interests in defense
(installations and plants) had increased over the same period.^"

There

was a tendency though for extreme hawks (type 0) and moderates (type
2 in 1961 and type 3 in 1968) to be somewhat overrepresented and the
doves (types 3 and 4 in 1961 and types 4 and 5 in 1968) to be under
represented on the three committees (combined) for both years.
Political party and voting: One notable political scientist has
written that, 11. . ., party continues to be more closely associated with

1
See Tables 12 and 13 in Chapter II.
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TABLE 14.— Committee Membership and Voting, by Number and Percentage,
House, 1961

Committee Members'"

a

Non-Committee Members

Scale
Type
(1).

Number
(2)

Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

0

13

25.0

80

20.9

1

8

15.4

66

17.3

2

25

48.1

65

17.0

3

2

3.8

82

21.5

4

4

7.7

89

23.3

52

100.0

382

100.0

Total

The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House members.
The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most
liberal (type 4).
c
The committee members were those representatives who served on one
of these committees in 1961: the House Armed Services committee and the
Defense Appropriations and the Military Construction Appropriations sub
committees of the House Appropriations committee.
1
congressional voting behavior than any other discernible factor."
This
statement was confirmed by the studies of Mitchell, Bozik, and Cobb (see
Chapter I). Whether this proposition also holds true for the roll call
votes selected for examination in this paper will be determined after
studying all of the results obtained.

Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, The
Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science,
Series LXIX, No. 1 (Baltimore, Md. :' The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), p.
34. (Hereinafter referred to as Party and Constituency.)
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TABLE 15.— Committee Membership and Voting, by Number and Percentage,
House, 1968

Committee Members'”

Non-Committee Members

Scale
Typeb
(1)

Number
(2)

Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

0

13

22.8

45

12.1

1

8

14.0

62

16.6

2

8

14.0

63

16.9

3

15

26.3

80

21.4

4

9

15.8

91

24.4

5

4

7.0

32

8.6

57

99.9

373

100.0

Total
3

The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House members.
The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most
liberal (type 5).
c
The committee members were those representatives who served on one
of these committees in 1968: the House Armed Services committee and the
Defense Appropriations and the Military Construction Appropriations sub
committees of the House Appropriations committee.
As far as political party and voting are concerned, some interesting
findings appear when the legislators are cross classified according to
these two variables.

This was done to test the hypothesis that Democrats

tended to be more pro-defense than Republicans.

This hypothesis was

proposed because some of the previous studies indicated that this had
1
been the trend (see Chapter I).
This hypothesis is clearly refuted by

This includes the study done by Samuel Huntington (Common Defense,
pp. 251-59).
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the data for both of the years studied.
1961.^

Table 16 shows the results for

For this year the Democratic House members tend to be located

near the liberal end of the scale (Column 3) while the Republicans tend
to be near the conservative end (Column 5). Table 17 shows the distri2
bution for 1968.
The trend in 1961 also continued to hold in 1968, with
only 6 Republicans falling the the two most liberal scale types (Column
4).

Thus the Republicans tended to be more pro-defense than the Demo

crats (at least in 1961 and 1968).

Russett also found this to be true in

his study.
The gammas obtained were - .595 for Table 16 and - .538 for Table
17, making the results very meaningful.

Several reasons can be offered

as to why the Democrats tended to be liberal instead of conservative on
national security issues.

One reason could be that many of the roll

calls used in this study were votes on foreign aid, which many
Democrats (outside of the South) tend to support.

Another reason could
O

be what Russett calls "the politics of opposition."

For example,

during the 1950's the Democrats in Congress usually tried to increase
the yearly defense budgets proposed by the Eisenhower Administration.
Defense also was one of the major issues raised by the Democrats during
the 1960 Presidential campaign (the "missile gap").

Thus, "'Preparedness

was a good vote-getting issue throughout the 1950's and most of the I960'

1
The scale types are the same ones used in Table 5, Chapter II.
2
The scale types are the same ones used in Table 6 , Chapter II.
3
Russett, Price, p. 86.
4
Ibid.
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TABLE 16.— Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage,3 House,
1961

Scale
Typeb

Democrats

Republicans

(1)

Number
(2)

0

31

11.9

62

35.8

1

41

15.7

33

19.1

2

36

13.8

54

31.2

3

64

24.5

20

11.6

4

89

34.1

4

2.3

261

100.0

173

100.0

Total

Percentage
(3)

Number
(A)

Percentage
(5)

g
The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House members.
The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most
liberal (type 4).
Still another reason might be that the Democrats have usually supported
governmental spending programs to try to solve some of the problems at
home and abroad while the Republicans have tended to favor economy in
government.
Still another factor which must be considered in analyzing the
voting in 1968 is the Vietnam war.

Although there were no important

roll call votes taken on the Vietnam issue in 1968, some congressmen had
begun to question U. S. involvement in Southeast Asia.

Opposition to

the war grew during the year, particularly within the ranks of the
Democratic party.

This questioning of American foreign policy by

members of the majority party may be explained by Lubell's "political
solar system" theory:

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68

TABLE 17.— Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage,
1968

Scale
Type

House,

Republi cans

Democrats
Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

(1)

Number
(2)

0

30

12.3

28

15.1

1

21

8.6

49

26.3

2

27

11.1

44

23.7

3

36

14.8

59

31.7

4

96

39.3

4

2.2

5

34

13.9

2

1.1

244

100.0

186

100.1

Total

The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House members.
The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most
liberal (type 5).
Our political solar system, . . ., has been characterized
not by two equally competing suns, but by a sun and a moon.
It is within the majority party that the issues of any par
ticular period are fought out; while the minority^party shines
in reflected radiance of the heat thus generated.
The roll calls examined in this study reflect the controversy over
national security issues present in 1968 which was not the case for 1961.
The dovish congressmen, largely because of the controversy over the

1
Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York:
& Brothers, 1951), p. 200.
2

Harper

See the sections in Chapter II concerned with the roll calls in
1961 and 1968.
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Vietnam war, were tending to question more and more of the nation's defense
and foreign policies which heretofore had been considered sacrosanct.
To further examine the relationship between political party and
voting, the technique of subclassification was used to hold the region
variable constant.

The results are shown in Tables 18 and 19.

values for the various sub-tables are as follows:

The gamma

Table 18a, - .953;

Table 18b, - .506; Table 18c, - .880; Table 18d, - .823; Table 19a, - .933;
Table 19b, - .291; Table 19c, - .829; Table 19d, 0 .853.

Thus the

relationship between political party and voting was very strong in all
regions of the country except the South for both years.

The South will

be examined in more detail in the next chapter.
There are also some other interesting findings which appear in the
tables.

Of the thirty-one extreme hawks (type 0) for the Democrats in

1961 (Table 16, Column 2), all but one came from the South (Table 18b,
Column 2).

The same situation occurred in 1968, with all but two of

the extreme Democratic hawks (type 0) coming from the South (Table 17,
Column 2 and Table 19b, Column 2).

Even most of the Democrats placed

in scale type 1 for both years came from the South.

On the other extreme,

over half of the Democratic representatives from the Northeastern and the
North Central states were extreme doves (type 4) in 1961 (Table 18a, Col
umn 3 and Table 18c, Column 3).

In 1968 over one half of the Democratic

representatives from the Northeastern (Table 19a, Column 3), the North
Central (Table 19c, Column 3), and the Western (Table 19d, Column 3)
states were placed in the two most liberal categories (types 4 and 5).
These results agree with those of'Russett's, who found that Northern Demo
cratic senators tended to be much less hawkish than Southern Democratic
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TABLE 18a.— Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House—
Northeast, 1961

Scale
Typea
(1)

Democrats
Number
(2)

Republicans
Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

0

0

00.0

10

16.9

1

0

00.0

7

11.9

2

19

33.9

39

66.1

3

2

3.6

2

3.4

4

35

62.5

1

1.7

Total

56

100.0

59

100.0

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most
liberal (type A).
senators.
In contrast the Republican House members tended to be either moder
ates or hawks in both 1961 and 1968.

In 1961 more than one half of the

Republican moderates (type 2) came from the Northeastern states (Table
16, Column 4 and Table 18a, Column 4), and over one half of the extreme
Republican hawks (type 0) came from the North Central states (Table 18c,
Column 4)."'’ Exactly one half of the extreme Republican hawks (type 0)
came from the North Central states in 1968 (Table 17, Column 4 and

Table

19c, Column 4), with the next largest group of extreme Republican hawks
coming from the South (Table 19b, Column 4).

On the other hand, one

half of the Republican doves (types 4 and 5) came from the Northeast

It should be pointed out that there were only ten Republican
congressmen from the South in 1961 in this study.
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TABLE 18b.— Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House—
South, 1961

Scale
Type3

Democrats

Republi cans

(1)

Number
(2)

0

30

24.8

5

50.0

1

33

27.3

3

30.0

2

11

9.1

1

10.0

3

31

25.6

1

10.0

4

16

13.2

0

00.0

121

100.0

10

100.0

Total

Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 4).
(Table 19a, Column 4).
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TABLE 18c.— Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House—
North Central, 1961

Scale
Type3
.

.(1)

Democrats
Number
(2)

Republic ans
Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

0

0

00.0

38

48.7

1

6

11.8

17

21.8

2

3

5.9

7

9.0

3

15

29.4

14

17.9

4

27

52.9

2

2.6

Total

51

100.0

78

100.0

a
The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most
liberal (type 4).
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TABLE 18d. — -Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House—
West, 1961

V

Scale
Type3
(1)

Democrats
Number
(2)

Republicans
Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

0

1

3.0

9

34.6

1

2

6.1

6

23.1

2

3

9.1

7

26.9

3

16

48.5

3

11.5

4

11

33.3

1

3.8

Total

33

100.0

26

99.9

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most
liberal (type 4).
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TABLE 19a.— Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House—
Northeast, 1968

Scale
Type3
(1)

Democrats

Republicans
■f

Number
(2)

Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

0

0

00.0

2

4.7

1

0

00.0

1

2.3

2

1

1.6

14

32.6

3

7

11.1

23

53.5

4

35

55.6

2

4.7

5

20

31.7

1

2.3

Total

63

100.0

43

100.1

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 5).
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TABLE 19b.— Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House—
South, 1968

Democrats

Scale
Type3

Republi cans

Percentage
(3)

(1)

Number
(2)

0

28

28.0

9

27.3

1

18

18.0

16

48.5

2

19

19.0

4

12.1

3

18

18.0

2

6.1

4

15

15.0

2

6.1

5

2

2.0

0

00.0

100

100.0

33

100.1

Total

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

^ h e scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most
liberal (type 5).
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TABLE 19c.— Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House—
North Central, 1968

Scale
Type*
(1)

Democrats
Number
(2)

Republicans
Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

0

1

2.3

14

17.5

1

3

6.8

27

33.7

2

3

6.8

15

18.8

3

2

4.5

23

28.8

4

27

61.4

0

00.0

5

8

18.2

1

1.3

44

100.0

80

100.1

Total

V-

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most
liberal (type 5).
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TABLE 19d.— Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House—
West, 1968

Democrats

(1)

Number
(2 )

Republicans
Percentage

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)
10.0

00.0

16.7

10.8

36.7

24.3

Total

11

36.7

51.4

00.0

10.8

00.0

100.0

30

100.1

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most
liberal (type 5).
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Holding the variable committee membership constant, further result^
were obtained in investigating the relationship between party and voting,
as shown in Tables 20 and 21.
as follows:

The gammas for the various sub-tables are

Table 20a, - .353; Table 20b, - .621; Table 21a, - .441;

Table 21b, - .556.

Thus in both years the relationship between political

party and voting was stronger among non-committee members (Tables 20b and
21b) than committee members (Tables 20a and 21a).
TABLE 20a.— Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House—
Committee Members, 1961

Scale
m
Type a
(1)

Democrats
Number
(2)

Repub1icans
Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

0

5

17.2

8

34.8

1

4

13.8

4

17.4

2

16

55.2

9

39.1

3

0

00.0

2

8.7

4

4

13.8

0

00.0

29

100.0

23

100.0

Total

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most
liberal (type 4).
Comparing the voting distribution of committee and non-committee
members reveals that the hawkish and moderate representatives tended to
be overrepresented (in percentage) on the various committees analyzed.
This was true for both parties in both years, with some exceptions.
the Democrats in 1961 the extreme hawks (type 0) and the moderates
(type 2) were overrepresented on the committees while the doves were
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TABLE 20b.— Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House—
Non-Committee Members, 1961

Scale
Typea

Democrats

Republi cans

(1)

Number
(2)

0

26

11.2

54

36.0

1

37

15.9

29

19.3

2

20

8.6

45

30.0

3

64

27.6

18

12.0

4

85

36.6

4

2.7

232

99.9

150

100.0

Total

Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

a
The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most
liberal (type 4).
underrepresented (Table 16, Column 3; Table 20a, Column 3; Table 20b,
Column 3).

In fact, more than 85 percent of the Democratic committee

members were placed in scale types 0-2 in 1961 (Table 20a, Column 3),
which is in sharp contrast to the non-committee membership distribution
(Table 20b, Column 3).

Similar results were obtained for 1968, with the

Democratic committee members tending to be more heavily concentrated in
the moderate and hawkish parts of the scale (Table 21a, Column 3)
compared with the general (Table 17, Column 3) and the non-committee mem
bership (Table 21b, Column 3) distributions.

Thus overall Democratic

committee members tended to be more hawkish than their other fellow Democrats.
As far as the Republicans were concerned, their committee members
tended to be overrepresented in the moderate (type 2) category and

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

80
TABLE 21a.— Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House—
Committee Members, 1968

Scale
Type3
(1)

Democrats
Number
(2)

Republicans
Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

0

6

18.2

7

29.2

1

4

12.1

4

16.7

2

2

6.1

6

25.0

3

9

27.3

6

25.0

4

9

27.3

. 0

00.0

5

3

9.1

1

4.2

33

100.1

24

100.1

Total

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most
liberal (type 5).
underrepresented in the more dovish (types 3 and 4) categories (Table
20a, Column 5) compared to the general (Table 16, Column 5) and the non
committee membership (Table 20b, Column 5) distributions in 1961.
The situation was somewhat different in 1968, with the more hawkish
representatives (types 0 and 1) being overrepresented (Table 17, Column
5; Table 21a, Column 5; Table 21b, Column 5).

Also, the one Republican

dove (type 5) serving on one of the committees in 1968 (Table 21a,
Columns 4 and 5) gave the Republican doves more representation (in
percentage terms) on these committees than was the case in the general
(Table 17, Column 5) and non-committee (Table 21b, Column 5) membership
distributions.

Thus no general overall pattern emerges for the Republi

can committee members for these two years.
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TABLE 21b.— Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House—
Non-Committee Members, 1968

Scale
Type3

Democrats

Republi cans
Percentage
(3)

(1)

Number
(2)

0

24

11.4

21

13.0

1

17

8.1

45

27.8

2

25

11.8

38

23.5

3

27

12.8

53

32.7

4

87

41.2

4

2.5

5

31

14.7

1

0.6

211

100.0

162

100.1

Total

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

aThe scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most
liberal (type 5).
Therefore of the two structural variables, political party was
more closely related to the voting behavior on defense issues than was
committee membership.

Although committee members as a whole tended to

be slightly more supportive of defense measures (Table 16, Columns 3 and
5; Table 17, Columns 3 and 5; Table 20a, Columns 3 and 5; Table 21a,
Columns 3 and 5), party was more influential in determining voting be
havior on national security legislation.

Summary

The findings in this chapter show that the relationship between
committee membership and voting, although not statistically meaningful,
pointed in the predicted direction.

Thus, committee members tended to be
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slightly more favorably inclined toward national security bills than
non-committee members.

Also, the predicted relationship between

political party and voting was incorrect.

The results indicate that

the Republicans, not the Democrats, tended to be more pro-defense, as
the term was defined in this study.

However, political party affiliation

was a better determinant of voting behavior than was committee membership.
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CHAPTER IV

REGION, CONSTITUENCY ECONOMIC INTERESTS, AND VOTING

External Influences

In the previous chapter it was determined that the structural
variable party was closely related to voting whereas committee member
ship was not.

In this chapter the two external influence variables,

region and constituency economic interests, will be considered to
determine if they were related to the dependent variable, voting out
come.

External influences, mentioned previously in Chapter I, are

outside reference points which may influence legislative voting on
national security issues, since they are a part of the legislators'
local environments.

Just as in the previous chapter, the results of

the analysis of the relationships between the independent variables and
the dependent variable will be presented in tables, along with either
the gamma or the contingency coefficient values obtained, whichever is
the appropriate statistic.

1

Region and voting: The external influence variable region includes
stable traditional attitudes which are based on regional subcultures.
How much these regional values and beliefs affected the voting on
national security issues is of special concern here.

As mentioned

The appropriate statistic was determined according to certain
criteria, which are mentioned in the sections on gamma correlation and
Pearson's contingency coefficient in Chapter II.
83
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in Chapter II, four regions were used in this study:
North Central, and West.

Northeast, South,

When the legislators are cross classified

.according to the variables of region and voting outcome, some interesting
findings appear.

Tables 22 and 23 show the voting patterns for each of

the regions in 1961 and 1968 respectively.

Table 22 has a corrected

contingency coefficient of .541 while Table 23 has one of .496."*'
TABLE 22.— Region and Voting, by Percentages,

a

House, 1961

Region

Scale
Typeb
(1)

Northeast
(2)

South
(3)

0

8.7

26.7

29.5

16.9

1

6.1

27.5

17.8

13.6

2

50.4

9.2

7.8

16.9

3

3.5

24.4

22.5

32.2

4

31.3

12.2

22.5

20.3

Total

100.0
(n=115)

100.0
(n=131)

West
(5)

North Central
(4)

100.1
(n=129)

99.9
(n=59)

aThe 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House
members.
bThe scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 4).

The original coefficient of contingency values are .484 for
Table 22 and .453 for Table 23 (The maximum value of C for a 5 by 5
table is .894 while for a 6 by 6 table it is .913). For more details
on how the corrected contingency coefficients were calculated see the
section on Pearson’s contingency coefficient in Chapter II.
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In 1961 the House members from the Northeast and the West tend to
be located toward the liberal end of the scale (Table 22, Columns 2 and
5).

However, Southern and North Central congressmen tend to be more

evenly distributed along the scale (Table 22, Columns 3 and 4).

The

trend is just about the same in 1968, with the Northeastern and the
Western representatives tending to be concentrated in the more liberal
scale types (Table 23, Columns 2 and 5) while again the Southern and the
North Central House members tend to be more evenly divided among the
scale types (Table 23, Columns 3 and 4).
TABLE 23.— •Region and Voting, by Percentages , House, 1968

Scale
Typeb

Region

(1)

Northeast
(2)

South
(3)

0

1.9

27.8

12.1

6.0

1

0.9

25.6

24.2

7.5

2

14.2

17.3

14.5

22.4

3

28.3

15.0

20.2

29.9

4

34.9

12.8

21.8

28.4

5

19.8

1.5

7.3

6.0

Total

100.0
(n-106)

100.0
(n-133)

North Central
(4)

100.1
(n=124)

West
(5)

100.2
(n=67)

The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House
members.
The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 5).
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To more fully determine the effect of region on voting behavior, the
party affiliation factor must be eliminated.

Therefore, the party variable

was held constant to investigate whether the voting patterns of Democrats
and Republicans were similar or different in each section of the country.
The results obtained are shown in Tables 24 and 25.

The corrected

contingency coefficients for the sub-tables are as follows:
.555; Table 24b, .640; Table 25a, .515; Table 25b, .634.

Table 24a,

Thus the re

lationship between region and voting was stronger among the Democrats
than the Republicans in both years.
TABLE 24a.— -Region and Voting, by Percentages , House— Republicans, 1961

Scale
Typea

Region

(1)

Northeast
(2)

South
(3)

0

16.9

50.0

48.7

34.6

1

11.9

30.0

21.8

23.1

2

66.1

10.0

9.0

26.9

3

3.4

10.0

17.9

11.5

4

1.7

00.0

2.6

3.8

100.0
(n=10)

100.0
(n=7 8)

99.9
(n=26)

Total

100.0
(n=59)

West
(5)

North Central
(4)

g

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 4).
Comparing the above results with those obtained when region instead
of party was held constant (Tables 18 and 19 in Chapter III), the tendency
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seems to be that party was a more important determinant of voting behavior
on national security issues than was region.

The distribution of the

scale scores within botfr^-parties for both years confirm this finding,
with the Northeastern, the North Central, and the Western Republicans
(Tables 24a and 25a, Columns 2,

and 5) generally tending to be more
\
conservative than their Democratic counterparts (Tables 24b and 25b,
Columns 2, 4, and 5).

Only in the South, where most of the representatives

were Democrats, does the trend fail to show.

Thus the differences

over the national security issues in this study tended to be due more
to party rather than regional attitudes.
TABLE 24b.--Region and Voting, by Percentages , House— Democrats , 1961

Scale
Typea

Region

(1)

Northeast
(2)

South
(3)

West
(5)

0

00.0

24.8

00.0

3.0

1

00.0

27.3

11.8

6.1

2

33.9

9.1

5.9

9.1

3

3.6

25.6

29.4

48.5

4

62.5

13.2

52.9

33.3

Total

100.0
(n=56)

100.0
(n=121)

100.0
(n=51)

100.0
(n=33)

North Central
(4)

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 4).
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TABLE 25 a. ~ -Region and Voting, by Percentages , House— Republic an, 1968

Region

Scale
Type3

West
(5)

(1)

Northeast
(2)

South
(3)

0

4.7

27.3

17.5

10.0

1

2.3

48.5

33.7

16.7

2

32.6

12.1

18.8

36.7

3

53.5

6.1

28.8

36.7

4

4.7

6.1

00.0

00.0

5

2.3

00.0

1.3

00.0

Total

100.1
(n=43)

North Central
(4)

.

100.1
(n=33)

100.1
(n=80)

100.1
(n=30)

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 5).
Also, it was hypothesized that Southern representatives are more
likely to vote for defense-related measures than are representatives
from the other sections of the country.

This hypothesis was proposed

because Cobb and Russett had found Southern representatives and senators
respectively to be very hawkish on national security measures.

Therefore

the scale score distributions of Southern and non-Southern representatives
were compared with each other for both years, with the results shown in
Tables 26 and 27.
Table 27."^

The gamma values are .235 for Table 26 and .538 for

The data give some support to the hypothesis, with the

^Gamma instead of the contingency coefficient was used because the re
gion variable was divided into two categories, thus making it dichotomous.
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TABLE 25b.— Region and Voting, by Percentages, House— Democrats, 1968

Region

Scale
Type3
(1)

Northeast
(2)

South
(3)

North Central
(4)

West
(5)

0

00.0

28.0

2.3

2.7

1

00.0

18.0

6.8

00.0

2

1.6

19.0

6.8

10.8

3

11.1

18.0

4.5

24.3

4

55.6

15.0

61.4

51.4

5

31.7

2.0

18.2

10.8

Total

100.0
(n=63)

100.0
(n=44)

100.0
(n=37)

100.0
(n=100)

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 5).
Since most of the Southern representatives were Democrats in both
years, the party variable was held constant to further compare the
Southern with the non-Southern representatives.
in Tables 28 and 29.

The results are shown

The gamma values for the sub-tables are as follows:

Table 28a, .327; Table 28b, .682; Table 29a, .512; Table 29b, .832.

The

relationship was much stronger in the majority party in the South (the
Democrats), which makes these findings more meaningful.

This further

supports the hypothesis that Southern representatives tended to be more
hawkish on national security measures than representatives from the other
sections of the country, with the trend increasing rather than decreasing.
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TABLE 26.— Region and Voting, by Number and Percentage,
and Non-Southerners, 1961

Southerners

Scale
Type
(1)

Number
(2)

cL

House— Southerners

Non--Southerners

Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

0

35

26.7

58

19.1

1

36

27.5

38

12.5

2

12

9.2

78

25.7

3

32

24.4

52

17.2

4

16

12.2

77

25.4

131

100.0

303

99.9

Total

The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House
members.
The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 4).
However, despite the hawkishness of the Southern Democrats, the Republi
cans still tended to be the more conservative of the two parties on
national security issues in both years (Tables 16, 17, 18, and 19 in
Chapter III).
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TABLE 27.— Region and Voting, by Number and Percentage,
and Non-Southerners, 1968

Scale
Type
(1)

Non--Southerners

Southerners
Number
.... (2)

House— Southerners

Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

0

37

27.8

21

7.1

1

34

25.6

36

12.1

2

23

17.3

48

16.2

3

20

15.0

75

25.3

4

17

12.8

83

27.9

5

2

1.5

34

11.4

133

100.0

297

100.0

Total

a
The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House
members'.
The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 5).
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TABLE 28a.— Region and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House— Southerners
and Non-Southerners, Republicans, 1961

Scale
Typea
.

(1)

Southerners
Number
(2)

Non--Southerners

Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

0

5

50.0

57

35.0

1

3

30.0

30

18.4

2

1

10.0

53

32.5

3

1

10.0

19

11.7

4

0

00.0

4

2.5

Total

10

100.0

163

100.1

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 4).
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TABLE 28b.— Region and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House— Southerners
and Non-Southerners, Democrats, 1961

Scale
Type3

Southerners

Non-■Southerners

(1)

Number
(2)

0

30

24.8

1

0.7

1

33

27.3

8

5.7

2

11

9.1

25

17.9

3

31

25.6

33

23.6

4

16

13.2

73

52.1

Total

121

100.0

140

100.0

Percentage
(3)

Number
(A)

Percentage
(5)

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 4).
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TABLE 29a.— Region and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House— Southerners
and Non-Southerners, Republicans, 1968

Scale
Typea
(1)

Non-■Southerners

Southerners
Number
(2)

Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

0

9

27.3

19

12.4

1

16

48.5

33

21.6

2

4

12.1

40

26.1

3

2

6.1

57

37.3

4

2

6.1

2

1.3

5

0

00.0

2

1.3

33

100.1

153

100.0

Total

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 5).
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TABLE 29b.— Region and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House— Southerners
and Non-Southerners, Democrats, 1968

Non-•Southerners

Southerners

Scale
Type3
(1)

Number
(2)

0

28

28.0

2

1.4

1

18

18.0

3

2.1

2

19

19.0

8

5.6

3

18

18.0

18

12.5

4

15

15.0

81

56.3

5

2

2.0

32

22.2

100

100.0

144

100.1

Total

Percentage
(3)

Number
(4)

Percentage
(5)

The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the
most liberal (type 5).
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Constituency economic interests and voting: In the recent debate
over the defense budget, the phrase "military-industrial complex" has
often been used to describe a supposedly powerful group which purport
edly has had much influence in shaping government defense policies.
This phrase was made famous by former President Eisenhower in his
Farewell Address to th.® nation, in which he warned against this "combi
nation" (see Chapter I).

To fully determine how much influence the

"complex" has had on governmental defense policies is far beyond the
scope of this study.

Nevertheless, certain propositions can be tested

using the data included in this paper.

Specifically, the relationships

between the constituency economic interests (installations and plants)
and congressional voting behavior will be analyzed to determine whether
the patterns of allocation affected the voting on defense-related legisf '

lation.
As mentioned in Chapter II, constituency economic interests were
defined in this study as consisting of those economic benefits in an
area derived from defense activities.

These interests, measured in this

study by the number of major military installations and private defense
plants located in each of the congressional districts, vary in amount
from one district to the next.

Despite various limitations,^ the data

used (Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 in Chapter II) can reveal a little about
whether defense allocation patterns were correlated with congressional
voting behavior on national security issues.

Accordingly, these two

The limitations are mentioned in the section on installations and
plant data in Chapter II.
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hypotheses were proposed.
1. The more military installations a congressional district
has, the more hawkish its representative will be.
2. The more defense contracts a congressional district
receives , the more likely its representative will be to
vote for defense-related programs.
For these hypotheses it was assumed that a congressman would vote to
get and retain direct economic benefits for his constituents.

Thus if

one congressman's district received more defense funds than another's,
the first congressman should theoretically have a smaller scale score
in this study than the second one.
The results obtained are shown in Tables 30, 31, 32, and 33.
gammas for these tables are as follows:
Table 32, -.129; Table 33, -.240.

The

Table 30, .082; Table 31, .042;

Therefore the two proposed hypotheses

are clearly refuted, thus agreeing with the findings of Mitchell, Bozik,
and Cobb.

These tables reveal some very interesting patterns.

In

1961 the most liberal category (type 4), as might be expected, has a
higher percentage of those districts with no military installations in it
than any other category (Table 30, Column 2).

But surprisingly, the most

conservative category (type 0) has the lowest percentage in Column 5,
which contains the districts with 3 or more military installations
(Table 30, Column 5).

There were similar trends in 1968, with the more

liberal congressmen again having a higher percentage of those districts
containing 3 or more military installations than do the more conservative
congressmen (Table 31, Column 5).

These results do not verify Russett's

conclusion that expenditures for military installations promote hawkish
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TABLE 30.— Military Installations and Voting, by Percentages,
1961

Scale
Type

House,

Number of Installations

(1)

None
(2)

1
(3)

2
(4)

4

29.1

15.7

18.5

15.5

3

16.6

25.6

11.1

21.4

2

17.7

17.4

22.2

31.0

1

17.1

17.4

14.8

17.9

0

19.4

24.0

33.3

14.3

Total

99.9
(n=175)

100.1
(n=121)

99.9
(n=54)

3 or More
(5)

100.1
(n=84)

a
The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House
members.
The scale types go from the most liberal (type 4) to the most
conservative (type 0).
attitudes.^
There is one general overall pattern for the distributions of the
defense plants (Tables 32 and 33).

2

In both 1961 and 1968 defense

plants tended to be more concentrated in the districts of liberal rather
than conservative congressmen.
urban-rural factor.

This may have occurred because of an

The liberals might generally tend to represent urban

"^See the section on Russett's study in Chapter I.
2

It was assumed by the writer that more defense contracts
(in a district) would result in more plants in which some defense
work was done.
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TABLE 31.— Military Installations and Voting, by Percentages,
1968

Scale
Type

House,

Number of Installations

(1)

None
(2)

1
(3)

2
(4)

5

13.4

3.0

5.0

4.4

4

19.9

26.7

26.7

25.0

3

20.9

24.8

16.7

26.5

2

15.4

16.8

20.0

16.2

1

18.4

11.9

15.0

17.6

0

11.9

16.8

16.7

10.3

Total

99.9
(n=201)

100.1
(n=60)

100.0
(n=68)

100.0
(n=101)

3 or More
(5)

£

The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House
members.
The scale types go from the most liberal (type 5) to the most
conservative (type 0).
industrial centers while the conservatives might generally tend to come
from the rural areas of the country, their districts thus lacking the
facilities needed to attract defense work.

Also, the negative gamma

values for both tables, though very low, are indications that the num
ber of defense plants tended to be negatively related to voting on
defense issues.

This result may in part be due to the large number of

foreign aid votes used in this study, which would further account for
the possible urban-rural pattern involved.
Thus the distribution of defense funds apparently had had no
effect on congressional voting behavior on the national security issues
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TABLE 32.— Defense Plants and Voting, by Percentages,

House, 1961

Number of Plants

Scale
Typeb
(1)

None
(2)

1
(3)

2
(4)

4

21.3

14.7

24.4

28.8

3

20.0

15.8

26.8

17.8

2

12.0

29.5

26.8

32.9

1

23.1

14.7

9.8

5.5

0

23.6

25.3

12.2

15.1

100.0
(n=95)

100.0
(n=41)

100.1
(n=73)

Total

100.0
(n=225)

3 or More
(5)

The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House
members.
bThe scale types go from the most liberal (type 4) to the most
conservative (type 0).
included in this study.

The supposed influence of the "military-industrial

complex" on congressmen did not appear in any form in this limited
analysis.

Summary

The analysis of data in this chapter shows that only one of the
proposed hypotheses pertaining to the external influence variables was
confirmed, and this only slightly so.

The results indicate that,

1. Southerners tended to be more pro-defense in their voting
on defense-related legislation than were representatives from
the other sections of the country.
2. The distribution of military installations was not related
to congressional voting on national security bills at all.
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TABLE 33.— Defense Plants and Voting, by Percentages,a House, 1968

Number of Plants

Scale
Type
(1)

None
(2)

5

6.4

9.5

8.5

12.2

4

20.1

24.8

34.0

23.0

3

15.7

24.8

23.4

35.1

2

17.6

15.2

14.9

16.2

1

20.6

18.1

12.8

4.1

0

19.6

7.6

6.4

9.5

Total

100.0
(n=204)

1
(3)

100.0
(n=105)

2
(4)

100.0
(n=47)

3 or More
(5)

100.0
(n=74)

^ h e 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House
members.
The scale types go from the most liberal (type 5) to the most
conservative (type 0).
3. The distribution of defense contracts also was not re
lated to congressional voting on national security issues at
all.
Furthermore, although the region variable was related to the voting,
it was not as meaningful as the party variable was in affecting
voting behavior on national security issues.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The Hypotheses

This research has been conducted to find out more about legisla
tive behavior in an important area of public policy— national security
affairs.

This was done by testing%ertain hypotheses through the use

of roll call analysis.

These hypotheses, presented in Chapter I, were

proposed using certain variables which had been examined previously in
the four studies mentioned in Chapter I.

The results of this study

will be related to the proposed hypotheses and also to the four studies
to determine whether the writer's findings agree or disagree with pre
vious conclusions.

The writer will also speculate about these findings

in the last part of this chapter.
The committee membership hypothesis: It was hypothesized that
committee members are more likely to vote for defense-related legislation
than are non-committee members.
not supported by the data.

The results show that this hypothesis is

Although the committee members as a whole

tended to be slightly more pro-defense than non-committee members, they
(the members) usually tended to vote along party lines on national
security roll calls.
As far as the other studies were concerned, only Mitchell and
Bozik used the committee membership variable in their studies.

They

both concluded that although the committee members as a whole tended to
102
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be slightly more supportive of national security measures, they still
tended to divide along party lines in their voting.

The results of

this study support the conclusion reached by both Mitchell and Bozik
that there was no consensus on defense-related matters in the committees
analyzed.
The writer’s findings in this area are subject to various limitations.
First of all, the committee members studied were those representatives
who served either on the House Armed Services committee or on one of the
two relevant subcommittees of the House Appropriations committee, which
handle domestic military programs.

But many of the roll call votes used

were not in the domestic defense category but were instead concerned with
American foreign policy.

Thus there was the possibility that some

committee members voted pro-defense on roll calls in one category and
anti-defense on roll calls in another.

Secondly, the writer did not

include two House committees, the House Foreign Affairs committee and the
House Science and Astronautics committee, which are also concerned with
national security matters.

Third, the writer did not analyze committee

hearings, where important issues were probably settled before the whole
House voted on the various proposals.

Finally, the military backgrounds

of committee and non-committee members were not included in this study.
This variable could also have been related to legislative voting behavior
on national security matters, indicating whether or not there was a
pro-military bias present, especially on the committees.
The political party hypothesis: As far as the political parties
and voting behavior were concerned, it was hypothesized that Democrats
are more likely to be pro-defense than are Republicans.

This hypothesis
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is clearly refuted by the data.

The Republicans tended to be more pro

defense than the Democrats in both of the years studied.

Furthermore,

of the four independent variables tested in this study political
party was the most important determinant of voting behavior on national
security legislation in both 1961 and 1968.

This adds further support

to Turner's contention that, "Party pressure seems to be more effective
than any other pressure on congressional voting, . .
In the other four studies, the writers came to different conclusions
about the political parties and their voting on defense issues.
Mitchell and Bozik found the Democrats to be more pro-defense while
Cobb and Russett found the Republicans to be more hawkish.

There may

be two reasons why Mitchell and Bozik obtained different results than
did Cobb, Russett, and this writer.

First of all, Mitchell and Bozik

included many roll call votes from the 1950's in their studies, whereas
Cobb, Russett, and this writer used only roll call votes from the 1960's.
The pattern in the 1950's seemed to be that the Democrats were more prodefense than the Republicans on national security matters.

2

In fact,

of the ten roll call votes Bozik used in his study to compute a pro
defense percentage for each party, seven were from the 1950's, which
could help explain his results.

3

Second, the definitions of what were

pro-defense and anti-defense votes on various types of legislation may
have differed in each study.

For example, Mitchell defined a vote as

Turner, Party and Constituency, p. 23.
2

Huntington, Common Defense, pp. 251-59.

3
Bozik, "Congressional Action," n. 1, p. 41.
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being pro-defense if it was " . . .

cast so as to favor an increase in

the magnitude of defense here or abroad, . . ."^

But the writer consider

ed voting for spending programs abroad, like foreign aid, to be anti
defense or liberal (see Chapter II), which may account for why the
writer concluded the the Republicans rather than the Democrats tended
to be more pro-defense.

However, the conclusion reached by Mitchell,

Bozk, and Cobb that political party was the most important determinant
of voting behavior on national security issues is supported by the data
of this study.
One serious limitation of the writer's analysis of the political
party variable was again the lack of votes on domestic defense measures,
which would have indicated how consistent the voting patterns were for
both parties on various defense-related issues.

Another limitation was

the lack of a study of informal party activities, such as party caucuses
and the meetings of party leaders with other high government officials,
where various defense and other legislative issues may have been resolved.
The region hypothesis: With regards to region and voting
patterns, it was hypothesized that Southerners are more likely to vote
for defense-related measures than are representatives from the other
sections of the country.

The data of this study somewhat support this

hypothesis and also show that region was related to the voting on national
security issues, though not as much as political party was.
In the other four studies, some evidence was included in each to
indicate the hawkishness of Southerners on national security issues.

Mitchell, "Legislative Decision-Making," p.233.
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Cobb found in his sutdy that Southern representatives were the most
hawkish group in both political parties.
Southern senators to be very hawkish.

In his research Russett found

Bozik, calculating the pro-defense

voting percentages for each section, determined that the South had the
highest overall sectional pro-defense voting percentage in his study.^
Finally, Mitchell, after calculating the South's sectional deviation from
the national party mean in her study, came to this conclusion about the
South:

"The most significant and strongly negative positions are found
2
in opposition to international defense programs and measures."
This
corresponds with the writer's assumptions about pro-defense (conservative)
voting on foreign policy roll calls in Chapter II.

Also, in all four

studies region was found to be related to the voting on national security
issues, just as the writer had found in his research.
In studying the region variable, the writer was again limited by
the nature of the roll call votes included in the analysis.

Not enough

roll call votes on domestic defense measures were available to fully
determine whether regional attitudes affected voting in all categories
of national security legislation.

Another limitation was that the

urbanization variable was not used in this study.

The urban-rural factor

may account for some of the differences attributed to the region variable
in this study.

^Bozik, "Congressional Action," p. 49.
2

Mitchell, "Legislative Decision-Making," p. 370.
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The military installations and defense contracts hypotheses: To
test the "military-industrial complex" concept, these two hypotheses
were proposed:
1. The more military installations a congressional district
has, the more hawkish its representative will be.
2. The more defense contracts a congressional district receives,
the more likely its representative will be to vote for defenserelated programs.
The results of this study refute these two hypotheses.

The distribution

of defense funds was not related to the voting on national security issues
at all.
In the other four studies, the writers also found that defense
spending within a constituency had very little (if any) correlation with
the voting behavior of the legislators with one exception.

Russett

concluded that military spending for local defense bases was more highly
correlated with defense voting in the Senate than was military spending
for local prime contracts.

However, the statistical methods he used in

obtaining these results are very questionable.

Instead of using the

gamma statistic as this writer did (see Chapter II), Russett used such
measures as rank-order correlation (tau) and level of significance in
his research, which are for statistical studies of samples rather than
whole populations.
As with the other hypotheses tested, the writer's findings about
the "military-industrial complex" are somewhat limited by the kinds of
roll calls used.

As has been mentioned before, many foreign policy roll

call votes were included in this study.

The writer felt that these

foreign policy votes might reveal possible relationships between the
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patterns of allocation and the patterns of congressional voting behavior, be
cause the same pressures which a constituency may put on its congressman to
vote to get and retain defense funds would also influence his voting on
foreign policy questions.

In other words

. ., pressures for cognitive

consistency would be expected to make influence on [defense] appropriations
voting go together with influence on foreign policy voting."'*'

Also, as

was mentioned previously, the urbanization variable was not examined in
this study, which might reveal more about the relationship between the
distribution of defense contracts and congressional voting behavior.

General Conclusions

The main purpose of this study has been to show how congressmen
reacted to certain decisional situations in the field of national security
affairs.

To also indicate why they did so cannot be determined by an

empirical analysis of votes alone.

Nevertheless, the writer will offer

some possible explanations for the results of this study.
The civilian control theory:

First of all, the results of this

study are inconclusive about the civilian control theory.

This theory,

mentioned at the beginning of Chapter I, states that both the executive
and the legislative branches of the government maintain a control over
the military.

Theoretically, Congress controls the military, mainly through

its "power of the purse."

While this study has shown that the commit

tee members were divided over national security issues and that the
distribution of defense funds apparently was not related to voting
behavior, the roll call votes used in this study were an indication of

^Cobb, "Defense Spending and'Foreign Policy," p. 362.
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the noncontroversial nature of defense bills.

In both of the years

studied, defense appropriation and authorization bills were passed with
little (if any) opposition in the House.

Only particular parts of these

bills were subjected to question and amendment.

Thus the results

obtained were based upon an analysis of roll call votes usually con
cerned with topics other than domestic defense measures.

Therefore more

research must be done, especially in the areas of the role of civilian
Pentagon officials in the defense budget process and the informal con
gressional activities concerned with military requests, (see Chapter I),
to more fully test the civilian control theory.
Democrats and Republicans: Second, there may be several reasons

\

why the Democrats tended to be more\pro-defense in the 1950’s while the
Republicans tended to be more hawkish^in the 1960's.

In the 1950’s

\

the Democrats had difficulties in opposing a Republican president who
was a war hero, especially during a period of great tension between East
and West.

Consequently, the Democrats, to show their concern for the

nation's defense, called for even larger defense budgets than did
President Eisenhower.

Furthermore, not many Democrats were elected from

the Midwestern (North Central) states, where there has been a tradition
of isolationism in foreign affairs in the past.
In the 1960’s the Democrats were confronted with the "guns" versus
"butter" issue.

The Democrats under President Johnson were faced with

either meeting domestic needs or honoring the United States' foreign
commitments, particularly in Southeast Asia.

Thus the Democrats had to

choose between satisfying the demands of their urban supporters or their
rural ones.

President Johnson chose the "guns," thus postponing efforts
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to meet domestic needs.

But other Democrats opposed this policy, especial

ly many Democrats from the urban Northeastern states who became very
dovish on national security matters (see Tables 18a and 19a in Chapter
III).

In contrast, the Republicans faced no such dilemma when confronted*’

with a choice between meeting urban or foreign needs, since their
supporters tended not to come from the cities.

Also, the famous "missile

gap" issue raised by the Democrats during the 1960 Presidential campaign
may have made the Republicans more determined than ever not to lost votes
in the future on the defense preparedness issue.
Conservative coalition: Finally, the future trend in the voting on
national security issues may be reflected in the results of this study.
The data of this study show that Republicans and Southerners tended to
be the most hawkish groups of all in the House of Representatives.

Thus

a coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats in the House might be
forming on national security votes, just as a similar alliance has existed
on many domestic issues:
But in these thirty years [1938-1968] a coalition,
predominantly rural, of Republicans and southern Demo
crats in the House of Representatives blocked or whit
tled down most of the presidential proposals— except
for a period of two years, 1965-1967, when, as a result
of the Goldwater fiasco, enough northern Democrats were
elected to create a shjrt-lived but effective liberal
majority in the House.
Furthermore, on two roll call votes concerning troop withdrawal from
Indochina taken in 1971, this same pattern also emerges, with mainly
Republicans and Southern Democrats on one side and Northern Democrats

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The. Crisis of Confidence: Ideas,
Power and Violence in America, Bantam Books (New York: Bantam Books,
Inc., 1969), p. 221.
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Ill
on the other.^

Whether this is the trend on other roll call votes is

a matter for further study.
Much more research needs to be done on the topic of congressional
voting behavior on national security issues.

Unlike the past, defense

policies have become more controversial recently.

All of the variables

which may be related to the voting behavior on defense-related legislation,
including those variables omitted from this study, should be further
analyzed to determine the influence of each variable in this key policy
area.

The two roll call votes are found in "House Vote on Withdrawal,"
New York Times, June 29, 1971, p. 33 and "CQ House Votes," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report, XXIX (October 23, 1971), 2206-207. (RC 205.
HR 8687)
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